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ABSTRACT 
Emily Meredith Gillen: Determinants and Effects of Plan Selection in the Non-Group Health Insurance 
Market  
(Under the direction of Kristen Hassmiller Lich) 
 
 Effective 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) required US citizens to be 
enrolled in an adequate health insurance plan. To provide a platform where individuals could compare 
and purchase health plans deemed to provide sufficient levels of coverage, the ACA required states to 
establish (or allow the federal government to establish) health insurance Marketplaces. Plans qualified to 
be sold on the exchange had to adhere to ACA regulations, for example replacing medical underwriting 
with community modified premiums. In addition, federal assistance was available on a needs basis. As a 
result of ACA devised changes, the non-group health insurance market increased 211% from 2013 to 
2015 (Carman, Eibner, & Paddock, 2015a). 
 The objectives of this research were to understand: (1) how consumers behaved in year one of the 
new health insurance Marketplaces; and (2) how they responded to plan benefits in the non-group health 
insurance market. This study utilized claims data from a large insurer with over 85% market share in the 
state non-group health insurance market (The Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts, 2013). I 
found individuals with advanced premium tax credits who were less healthy were more likely to use their 
credits to purchase more generous health plans. Individuals were more likely to access additional 
outpatient services after they reached their out-of-pocket maximum and self-selection into a narrow 
network plan had no impact on number of outpatient visits but did increase the percentage of visits with 
participating providers. Narrow network plans were associated with a reduction in out-of-pocket costs.   
 Historically, the non-group market has not often been studied, but it’s becoming increasingly 
important (Nadash & Day, 2014; M. V. Pauly & Nichols, 2002; Sommers, 2014). With each year of 
operation the non-group market continues to grow and the Marketplaces continue to evolve. Industry 
leaders and policymakers need to understand the behavior of the unique consumers in this market in 
order to create future policies that preserve or increase access to quality care while containing costs.  
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CHAPTER 1: DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF PLAN SELECTION: OVERVIEW 
Specific Aims 
 The Marketplaces established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
fundamentally altered the health insurance market by fostering a consumer-driven atmosphere and 
expanding the non-group market in an industry previously dominated by group purchasing. The 
Marketplaces were platforms through which consumers could compare qualified health plans (QHPs) 
being sold in the non-group health insurance market in their area. QHPs were health insurance plans that 
were certified as having met the regulations and standards of the ACA, such as limits on out-of-pocket 
spending, coverage of essential health benefits, and modified community rated premiums  (Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2014). Additionally, the actuarial value of the QHPs had to align with ACA 
specified generosity levels represented by metal designations ("The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act," 2010). Federal assistance, in the form of premium reducing tax credits and cost sharing 
reductions, was available to qualified individuals who enrolled in a QHP (Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2012a). The ACA also required that QHPs extend benefits to all potential beneficiaries, regardless of any 
pre-existing conditions. Coverage of pre-existing conditions, modified community ratings, and premium 
subsidies attracted new entrants to the market who had previously been unable to purchase health 
insurance. The individual mandate, which required all US citizens to have adequate health insurance, 
also spurred new entrants to the market, perhaps some who had not previously been interested in health 
insurance coverage. Between 2013 and 2015, the non-group market expanded 211% from 8.5 million 
individuals to 17.9 (Carman et al., 2015a).   
 Not all individuals in the non-group market in 2014 were enrolled in a QHP. Although all individuals 
had the option to switch to a QHP, many individuals who were enrolled on a non-group plan prior to 2014 
were allowed to remain in that plan and chose to do so (Lucia, 2014). Consumers in the 2014 non-group 
market had more choices than ever before. Nonetheless, selecting a health insurance plan can be 
challenging, even though the Marketplaces tried to ease the cognitive burden of plan selection through 
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standardization. Health insurance plan selection is difficult because it involves understanding complicated 
plan designs, comparison of multiple plan options, consideration of future known healthcare needs, and 
decision-making under uncertainty (Lore, Gabel, McDevitt, & Slover, 2012) (Baicker, Congdon, & 
Mullainathan, 2012) (Long et al., 2014). Although difficult, selecting a health plan is important and can 
have real consequences on healthcare utilization and out-of-pocket costs.  
 In this dissertation I elucidated observable characteristics associated with plan selection in the 2014 
non-group health insurance market and analyzed the effect of plan selection on healthcare utilization and 
out-of-pocket costs to the beneficiary. The objectives of this research were to understand: (1) how 
consumers behaved in year one of the new health insurance Marketplaces; and (2) how they responded 
to plan incentives in non-group health insurance market. To achieve this I addressed three specific aims: 
Aim 1.  Determine the key observable factors associated with plan switching and plan selection in the 
health insurance Marketplace. 
Aim 2. Analyze the extent to which the marginal cost of care affected the utilization of healthcare 
services for ambulatory care sensitive conditions. 
Aim 3 Assess the effect of network choice on number of outpatient visits, percentage of visits with 
providers participating in the narrow network, and out-of-pocket costs. 
 The data come from a large insurer. In 2014, this insurer was one of only two companies offering 
QHPs in the state Marketplace and the only insurer offering QHPs in every county; in 2013, it had 86% of 
the non-group market (The Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts, 2013).  I utilized claims data 
which included not only healthcare services but the costs of those services as well. I also directly 
observed plan benefit information such as deductibles, coinsurance, and premiums.   
 Study findings could positively impact the non-group health insurance market by providing a better 
understanding of consumer behavior in the first year of Marketplace operation. Historically, the non-group 
market has not often been studied, but it’s becoming increasingly important as it continues to grow under 
the provisions of the ACA (Nadash & Day, 2014; M. V. Pauly & Nichols, 2002; Sommers, 2014). The non-
group market operates differently than the markets for public and employer-sponsored group health 
insurance; in the non-group market each individual agent self-selects a health plan based on their 
budgetary allowances, age, sex, risk tolerance, and expected healthcare utilization (K. Ericson & A. Starc, 
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2012; Lako, Rosenau, & Daw, 2011). Effective policies require that consumers understand the health 
insurance system and appropriately respond to incentives in the benefits structure of health plans. 
Industry leaders and policymakers need to understand consumer behavior with regards to recent reforms 
in order to create future policies that preserve or increase access to quality care while containing costs. 
 The non-group health insurance market, in which individuals compare a large number of options and 
purchase health plans directly from insurers, is growing (Carman et al., 2015a). The ACA sets up a 
market that promotes consumerism and individual choice (Oberlander, 2014). Industry leaders and 
policymakers need to provide understandable information to consumers so that individuals are able to 
make informed decisions when selecting and using health insurance benefits. Individuals must take a 
broader view of health insurance by not reacting solely to the immediate, up-front costs of the monthly 
premium, but also considering the effects of cost sharing on utilization and network size on provider 
selection. By analyzing enrollment during the first year of health insurance Marketplaces we can better 
learn how individuals are operating within the market and how they are using the plans they select. 
Organization of this Dissertation  
 To inform the reader of important fundamentals of the ACA and to provide context, Chapter 2 
provides relevant details of the ACA as well as an overview of the current literature. Chapters 3 through 5 
are manuscripts addressing the three specific aims. Each of these chapters was written for individual 
submission to peer-reviewed publications and, as such, contains an introduction and conclusion relevant 
to the paper objective. Chapter 6 discusses the research findings and policy implications of this 
dissertation, examines the strengths and limitations of the study, and lays out a future research agenda 
based upon the results. Each of the appendices provide information that is beyond the scope of a journal 
article. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND ON THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 This chapter was designed to orient the reader to the current state of the non-group health insurance 
market. First I provide background information on health insurance and the provisions of the ACA relevant 
to this dissertation. Following the background section I provide a review of the current literature on plan 
selection and the effect of health insurance on utilization.  
Background  
 The health insurance market can be complicated and the ACA brought many reforms to the market. 
In the background section below I provide fundamental information on health insurance and relevant 
provisions of the ACA. 
Health Insurance 101 
 Health insurance plans use contract negotiations and risk pooling to provide beneficiaries with 
discounts on healthcare services.  For a monthly premium, individuals enroll in a plan which assists them 
in paying for healthcare services throughout the policy year. To stave off moral hazard, the assumption 
that when individuals are shielded from the full costs of services they exhibit less discretion in their 
demand for care, insurance companies incorporate cost-sharing into plan design (Aron-Dine, Einav, & 
Finkelstein, 2013; Arrow, 1963). Cost-sharing refers to the portion of healthcare costs for which the 
beneficiary is responsible and can take the form of deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, or annual 
spending caps. Deductibles are the amount that the member has to pay before the insurance company 
begins to pay for services, although not all plans have deductibles. Coinsurance is the portion of the cost 
of care for which the member is responsible. Coinsurance is expressed as a percentage, and is 
applicable after the deductible has been paid. Copayments are fixed amounts that the member owes at 
the time of service and do not count towards the deductible. Annual spending caps, also referred to as 
out-of-pocket maximums, are the limits on expenditures for which the beneficiary is responsible. The out-
of-pocket maximum includes deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments, but not premiums (Department 
of Health and Human Services, 2014). 
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 There are different types of health plans, all of which employ some elements of cost-sharing. 
Traditional health plans, such as preferred provider organization (PPOs) and point of service (POS) 
plans, often use copayments to encourage routine outpatient visits instead of more costly inpatient 
admissions, when possible. A recent trend has been the shift towards consumer directed plans or high 
deductible health plans (HDHPs). HDHPs encourage individuals to take more responsibility for healthcare 
by imposing large deductibles (defined as >$1,250 in 2014) which must be met before plans contribute 
towards the cost of services (Buntin et al., 2006; Internal Revenue Service, 2015).   
 In addition to cost-sharing, health plans use contracting and provider networks to encourage more 
consumer engagement in the selection of healthcare services. Starting as early as the 1970’s, mounting 
pressure from rising healthcare costs led to the managed care boom of the 1990s (Mechanic, 2004).  The 
term “managed care organizations” applies to a set of healthcare products including pre-paid group 
practices, capitated plans, and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) (Mechanic, 2004). A common, 
but not defining, trait of managed care was utilization management under which a third-party regulated 
care for beneficiaries (Mechanic, 2004). The late 1990’s saw a backlash against managed care 
organizations and a return to fee-for-service plans. PPOs and POSs, under which insurers contract with 
groups of providers and facilities to offer in-network services to members at reduced rates, gained in 
popularity (Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). PPOs allow beneficiaries to get care from 
wherever they choose, but members pay more for care delivered from providers and facilities who were 
not contracted to be “preferred providers” within the plan network.  Today’s healthcare system includes 
hybrid plans, which combine aspects of HMOs, PPOs, POSs, and HDHPs to reduce moral hazard and 
encourage more consumer involvement (Mechanic, 2004).  
The Affordable Care Act and Market Expansion  
 On March 23, 2010, the ACA was signed by President Barack Obama ("The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act," 2010). The law was famously over 900 pages long and, though it covered a variety 
of aspects of the healthcare system, many of the most well-known provisions focused on the health 
insurance market.  Provisions included the establishment of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(section 3127), allowing dependents younger than 26 to remain on their parents’ health insurance plans 
(section 2714), and a path for the expansion of state-based Medicaid programs (section 2001) ("The 
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Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act," 2010). The passage of the ACA immediately provided 
coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions (guaranteed issue), first through high-risk pools and 
then by prohibiting plans from excluding pre-existing conditions (section 1101) ("The Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act," 2010). Arguably, one of the most impactful portions of the law was the 
individual mandate, as it has come to be called, and the creation of the state-based and federal-facilitated 
marketplaces. The individual mandate stipulated that all individuals purchase, and are covered by, 
adequate health insurance, unless exempt (section 1501) ("The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act," 2010). To provide access to adequate health insurance, the ACA called for the creation of the health 
insurance Marketplaces (Marketplaces), a forum where individuals in each state could shop for insurance 
plans that would provide acceptable levels of coverage. The Marketplaces were intended to (and 
arguably have) facilitated the comparison and purchasing of health insurance plans 
 In 2014, 15 states opted to operate their own state-based Marketplaces while Marketplaces in other 
states were either supported or fully run by the Federal Government (Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation, 2014). Regardless of whether the Marketplace was run by the federal or state 
government, for plans to be sold in the Marketplace they had to first be certified as a qualified health plan 
(QHP) by the Department of Insurance of the state in which the Marketplace would be operating. To 
obtain the QHP designation, plans had to adhere to various restrictions and stipulations outlined in the 
ACA. Among the ACA provisions, plans had to align actuarial value with established metal levels, use 
modified community ratings when setting premiums, and cover a set of essential health benefits.  
Metal Level Designations  
 QHPs were assigned a metal level (platinum, gold, silver, or bronze) based on the plan’s actuarial 
value. Actuarial value is the average total cost that a plan will cover, for example a plan with an actuarial 
value of 90% means, on average, the plan covers 90% of all healthcare costs and the beneficiary is 
responsible for 10%. Actuarial value was based on “actual average spending by a wide range of 
consumers in a standard population,” and was calculated using a standard algorithm developed by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (Department of Health and Human Services, 2013) (section 
1301) ("The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act," 2010). Insurers had to adjust QHP benefits to 
make actuarial value of a plan match the actuarial values assigned to each metal level. Generally, 
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platinum plans have an actuarial value of 90%, gold plans have an actuarial value of 80%, silver 70% 
(with the notable exception for plans enhanced by cost-sharing reductions (CSR) that increase the 
actuarial value of silver plans for qualified low income individuals), and bronze plans have an actuarial 
value of 60%. Catastrophic plans, which were available to individuals under 30 or those who qualify for a 
“hardship exemption,”
1
 had to meet ACA standards of offered benefits, but could have actuarial values 
below 60%. Within each metal level there could have been a variety of premium and cost-sharing 
arrangements, so long as actuarial value remained within metal level specifications (Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2013).  
Federal Assistance Programs  
 Federal assistance was provided to eligible individuals who purchased QHPs in the Marketplace. 
Generally, assistance was available on a sliding scale to individuals with income between 100% and 
400% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), with additional levels of assistance available to individuals with 
income between 100% and 250% FPL. In addition to means-tested income qualifications, receipt of 
federal assistance required individuals to be United States citizens or legal immigrants. Additionally, 
individuals who qualified for any public form of health insurance coverage (i.e. Medicaid, the Children's 
Health Insurance Program, Medicare, or military coverage) and individuals with access to affordable 
employer-sponsored health insurance plans
2
 were not eligible for federal assistance (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2012a). Assistance was not available to individuals on catastrophic plans even if they were 
purchased in the Marketplace.  
 In 2014, there were two types of federal assistance made available to qualified individuals to make 
health insurance more affordable: advanced premium tax credits (APTCs) and CSRs. Unlike many of tax 
credits which are distributed around income tax filing dates, the APTC was immediately applied to plan 
premiums to lower the monthly cost of the health insurance plan. The amount of the APTC was a function 
of the price of the second lowest cost silver plan in an individual’s region and that individual’s income as a 
percentage of FPL. Although generally the APTC was available to individuals with income between 100% 
                                                     
1
 There are fourteen “hardship exemptions” which deal with income, employment and other factors that can influence 
an individual’s ability to access health insurance (https://www.healthcare.gov/exemptions/). 
 
2
 If an employee did not have access to employer-sponsored health insurance plan with an actuarial value of at least 
60% or if the portion of the subscriber premium for which the employee was responsible exceeded 9.5% of the 
employee's total income, than that individual would be eligible for federal assistance if they purchased a QHP in the 
Marketplace. 
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and 400% of FPL, receipt of the APTC was based on the percentage of an individual’s income that would 
have been consumed by the cost of the second lowest cost silver plan. APTCs were calculated so that 
individuals with income between 300-400% FPL would not be required to spend more than 9.5% of their 
income on premiums. If the second lowest cost silver plan in a region was greater than 9.5% of an 
individual’s income, that individual would be eligible for APTCs, but if the premiums of the second lowest 
cost silver plan were lower than their income that individual would be required to pay the full price of the 
premium of whatever plan they chose.  The percentage of their income individuals are responsible for 
spending on health insurance premiums decreases as income as a percent of FPL decreases; for 
example, individuals with income between 100% and 133% FPL are only required to spend 2% of their 
income on insurance premiums (Figure 1) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012a) 
 Unlike APTCs, which could be used to purchase plans of all metal levels, CSR qualification was 
dependent on an individual having enrolled in a silver level QHP.  Individuals between 100% and 250% 
FPL are eligible for CSR (which are available in addition to, and not in lieu of, APTCs). CSRs effectively 
serve to increase the actuarial value of silver plans. For example, an individual between 150% and 200% 
FPL who purchases a silver plan, would pay the premium for that plan (less any APTCs) but in return 
would get a QHP with an actuarial value of 87% (meaning they would only be responsible for 
approximately 13% of costs out-of-pocket) (Table 1) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012a). 
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Table 1: Sliding Scale Federal Assistance for 2014 
Income as a % 
of FPL 
Maximum percent of income 
to be spent on premium (for 
APTC amount) 
Actuarial Value of a Silver 
Plan (accounting for CSR 
assistance) 
Out-of-Pocket Limits 
(individual/ family) 
under 100% no maximum 70% $6,350 / $12,700 
100%-133% 2% 94% $2,250 / $4,500 
133%-150% 3%-4% 94% $2,250 / $4,500 
150%-200% 4%-6.3% 87% $2,250 / $4,500 
200%-250% 6.3%-8.05% 73% $5,200 / $10,400 
250%-300% 8.05%-9.5% 70% $6,350 / $12,700 
300%-400% 9.50% 70% $6,350 / $12,700 
over 400% no max 70% $6,350 / $12,700 
Federal Poverty Level = FPL                                                            (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012a) 
Out-of-Pocket Maximums 
 The ACA required all QHPs have an out-of-pocket maximum, a cap on total healthcare expenditures 
for which a beneficiary is responsible over the course of a policy year. The out-of-pocket maximum 
included all expenditures for approved services accessed within the beneficiary’s provider network, such 
as deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments. The out-of-pocket maximum does not include premiums or 
non-covered services. Out-of-network care is usually subject to a separate out-of-pocket maximum or to 
no out-of-pocket maximum  at all (Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). In 2014, the out-of-
pocket maximum for in-network care was $6,350 for an individual plan and $12,700 for a family plan 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012a). Individuals eligible for cost-sharing federal assistance programs are 
only responsible for a fraction of the out-of-pocket maximum (Table 1). 
Modified Community Ratings  
 In addition to federal assistance, the ACA attempted to make health insurance plans more affordable 
by requiring that QHPs employed modified community ratings when setting premiums. Prior to ACA 
regulations, non-group health plan premiums were calculated using medical underwriting. Medical 
underwriting is a common practice used by insurers to set premiums based on an individual’s age, sex, 
past healthcare utilization, and expected health status (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012b). Modified 
community rating means premiums are only a function of region, age, number of dependents on the 
policy, tobacco use, and the actuarial value of the plan (section 2701) ("The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act," 2010). The ACA regulates the degree to which premiums can vary by age; the 
premium for the oldest adult cannot be more than 3 times the premium for the youngest adult. The 
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provision regarding tobacco use is similar in that users cannot be charged more than 1.5 times the 
premium of non-users. Modified community ratings provide lower premiums to individuals who were 
previously expensive under medical underwriting but, because they level the playing field, modified 
community rated premiums can be higher than underwritten premiums for some individuals (Goldman, 
Leibowitz, Buchanan, & Keesey, 1997; Whitmore, Gabel, Pickreign, & McDevitt, 2011). 
Essential Health Benefits  
 To qualify as a QHP, a plan must cover a set of essential health benefits which include the items and 
services within at least the following 10 categories: (1) ambulatory patient services; (2) emergency 
services; (3) hospitalization; (4) maternity and newborn care; (5) mental health and substance use 
disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; (6) prescription drugs; (7) rehabilitative and 
habilitative services and devices; (8) laboratory services; (9) preventive and wellness services and 
chronic disease management; and; (10) pediatric services, including oral and vision care (section 1302) 
("The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act," 2010). 
 The details of the services offered within the essential health benefit categories are based on a state 
specific benchmark plan which must be either one of the “…three largest small group plans, the three 
largest state employee health plans, the three largest federal employee health plan options, or the largest 
HMO (health maintenance organization) offered in the state's commercial market,” (Rules and Regulation, 
2013).  Costs for these services get distributed among all QHP beneficiaries, even those who do not use 
the services; for example, because community rated premiums do not discriminate by sex all plans pay 
for maternity and newborn care coverage, even if the beneficiary is a male.    
Grandfathered and Transitional Plans 
 Not all beneficiaries in the 2014 non-group market were enrolled in a QHP. The ACA contained a 
provision to allow individuals enrolled in a non-group plan as of March 23, 2010 (when the law passed) to 
remain in that particular plan (“Grandfathered”) rather than being forced to switch to a QHP. In 2013, it 
was announced that individuals who did not qualify for Grandfathered status would be allowed to remain 
in a non-ACA compliant plan in 2014 so long as they were already enrolled in a non-group plan as of 
October 1, 2013 (“Transitional”) (Lucia, 2014).  During the open enrollment period of 2014, individuals in 
Grandfathered or Transitional plans had two options: (1) to stay in their same 2013 plan or (2) switch to a 
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QHP. Grandfathered and Transitional plans were not subject to the same regulations required of QHPs; 
notably, no federal assistance was provided on non-QHPs, premiums continued to be set using medical 
underwriting, and there were no minimum essential health benefit requirements.    
Literature Review  
 Although the ACA brought a lot of change to the non-health insurance market, there is much that can 
be learned from past reform efforts, both domestic and international (Nadash & Day, 2014). In the section 
below I provide a review of the current literature on re-enrolling on a health plan versus switching health 
plans, complications to choosing a health plan, and the effect of cost-sharing on utilization. 
Plan Switching vs. Re-enrollment  
Status quo bias 
 Switching health plans requires different motivation and levels of effort than joining a new health plan 
or re-enrolling in a current plan. In the US commercial health insurance market, individuals routinely re-
enroll in a health plan during open enrollment periods or select a new health plan at a fixed point in time, 
often when they start a job or incur a qualifying event (e.g., getting married or having a child). However, 
switching plans during an open enrollment period requires active consumer participation. The active 
decision to switch health plans involves seeking out and comprehending potentially hard to find and 
complicated information (Lako et al., 2011; Frank, 2009).  
 Previous studies have found that individuals tend to reenroll in, rather than switch, health plans; this 
tendency not to switch plans is referred to as status quo bias (Frank, 2009; Strombom, Buchmueller, & 
Feldstein, 2002). Evidence of status quo bias has been observed in non-US health insurance markets 
(where switching health plans has lower transaction costs) and among Medicare beneficiaries (even 
when switching would result in lower premiums and out-of-pocket costs) (Hunt Kearsley, Upchurch, 
Holmes, & Weinberger, 2012; Lako et al., 2011; Neuman, 2009).  A study of enrollment in Medicare Part 
D, a pharmaceutical program for seniors, found that participants often did not choose the plan that would 
have been associated with the lowest levels of out-of-pocket costs and were often reluctant to switch to 
lower cost plans once enrolled (J. Gruber, 2009).  Other countries have also seen evidence of individuals 
not switching, regardless of potential cost savings (Lako et al., 2011).  
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 However, price is not the only factor in the decision to re-enroll or switch plans, switching health 
plans can sometimes require individuals to choose a new provider or hospital system (Pendzialek, Simic, 
& Stock, 2014). Additionally, there is often no perfect substitute between plans because of provider 
contracting and brand recognition (K. M. Ericson & A. Starc, 2012; Keeler & Rolph, 1988). 
 Although status quo bias is difficult to break, switching can occur when price and / or benefit 
differences are sufficiently large. Buchmueller and Feldstein found that when the University of California 
increased premiums by $20 a month, 30% of beneficiaries switched plans, that was a 600% increase in 
the rate of switching compared to when premiums were constant across years (Buchmueller & Feldstein, 
1997). A recent systematic literature review of the price elasticity of demand for health insurance found 
low elasticity of demand (-0.2 - -1.0) in the US.
3
 However, the study was conducted before the ACA and 
countries with mandatory health insurance tended to have higher elasticity, perhaps due to more options 
in the marketplace (Pendzialek et al., 2014). With more options and variation in price in the non-group 
health insurance market in the US, consumers in the Marketplace may be more willing to switch health 
plans in the future.  
 Not all individuals have the same propensity to switch health plans. In general, older and less healthy 
individuals are less likely to switch plans ((Buchmueller & Feldstein, 1997; Pendzialek et al., 2014). Older 
individuals tend to be less price sensitive than younger individuals are therefore may be less likely to 
respond to premium increases by switching to a lower cost plan (K. Ericson & A. Starc, 2012).  Less 
healthy individuals and individuals with established provider relationships are less likely to switch because 
new plan benefits and networks may lead to disruptions in continuity of care (Lako et al., 2011). 
Adverse Selection 
 Conditional on the decision to switch, health plan selection is influenced by price, age, sex, risk 
tolerance, and expected healthcare utilization (K. Ericson & A. Starc, 2012; Lako et al., 2011). Risk 
tolerance and expectations of future utilization can create differences in how individuals respond to 
prices: healthier individuals opt for cheaper, less generous plans while individuals who are less healthy 
                                                     
3
 Elasticity of demand refers to the percentage change in demand for a good or service when the price increases by 
one unit; an elasticity of -0.2 means that a one unit increase in the price of health insurance would cause a 0.2% 
decrease in demand (Mankiw, 2012).  A perfectly inelastic good would have a price elasticity of 0 (a one unit change 
in the price decreases demand by 0%). 
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and/or expect higher healthcare costs purchase more generous (and expensive) plans (Naessens et al., 
2008; van den Berg et al., 2008).  
 The theory of adverse selection states that  individuals who anticipate high medical costs are more 
likely to enroll in plans that offer more generous coverage and individuals who are healthier are more 
likely to choose a cheaper plan or opt out of the health insurance market entirely (Swartz & Garnick, 
2000). Large price differentials may exacerbate adverse selection. If the price differences are large 
enough they may encourage healthier individuals to switch out of the expensive plan leaving only higher-
risk individuals who are less price sensitive and do not respond to price changes in the same way (van 
den Berg et al., 2008). A plan with majority of unhealthy beneficiaries will have an unbalanced risk pool, 
which in turn drives up premiums even further (D. Z. Cutler, RJ., 1998).  Since insurers are not allowed to 
employ medical underwriting in setting premiums, the ACA contains language to mitigate the effects of 
unbalanced risk pools between health insurers.  The ACA provisions are known as the three R’s: risk 
adjustment, reinsurance, and risk corridors (Blumenthal, 2014). 
 Tcherins et al. describe an example of adverse selection in the behavior of employees who switch 
plans due to health-related factors (absent any policy changes). In this example there are four groups of 
individuals who were studied over a multi-year period: (1) a group who stays on a less generous plan for 
the study period, (2) individuals who switch from a less generous plan to a more generous plan, (3) a 
group who stays on a more generous plan, and (4) those who switch from a more generous to a less 
generous plan. Individuals who switch to a more generous plan (group 2) utilize more care than all other 
groups and individuals who switch to a less generous plan (group 4) utilize less care then all other groups 
(Tchernis, Normand, Pakes, Gaccione, & Newhouse, 2006).  The Tchernis et al. study suggests that 
sicker individuals switched to a more generous health plan because they were anticipating higher health 
costs and, accordingly, they used more care. Similarly, a 2008 study found that when forced to choose 
between two health plans (one with high premiums and low patient cost-sharing, the other with lower 
premiums and a higher deductible) individuals with chronic and preexisting conditions were more likely to 
enroll in the higher cost, more generous plan (Naessens et al., 2008).  
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Barriers to Choosing a Health Plan  
Decision Fatigue  
 On average, the non-group health insurance market has offered more choices than are typically 
offered to individuals who obtain health insurance through an employer, and the ACA has expanded the 
number of insurers in the non-group market (Hanoch & Rice, 2006; M. Pauly, Percy, & Herring, 1999). 
Although numbers vary by state and rating region, on average, consumers in the 2014 Marketplaces 
chose between 47 plans from 5 insurers while almost 50% of individuals with employer-sponsored 
coverage were offered plans from only one or two insurers (Jost, 2014). Studies of enrollment in Medicare 
Part D have found that participants had a difficult time choosing between plans (Hanoch, Rice, 
Cummings, & Wood, 2009; Lau & Stubbings, 2012).  Although studies have shown that older individuals 
may have more challenges making selections from a large choice set, there is also evidence of younger 
individuals having difficulties choosing between health insurance plans (Hanoch & Rice, 2006; Barnes, 
Hanoch, & Rice, 2015). As the number of choices increase, making a selection from a set of options 
becomes more cognitively challenging and individuals may experience decision fatigue (Rice, 2013) 
(Lako et al., 2011). Decision fatigue is a phenomena where, when faced with a multitude of options, 
individuals may rush into a suboptimal decision merely to end the decision making process (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000).  
Complex Benefit Designs 
 The complex non-linear structure of health insurance can be difficult to understand and can make 
direct comparisons between plans challenging (Lore et al., 2012; Baicker et al., 2012; Long et al., 2014). 
Individuals do not always understand health insurance related terminology, and if individuals do not 
understand the benefit structure of their plan, they may not respond to incentives in the intended way 
(Loewenstein et al., 2013). If people do not respond to incentives as designed then (1) health plans will 
not have their intended effect of encouraging consumers to use care more responsibly, and (2) consumer 
satisfaction may decrease when individuals are confused about coverage limits and / or out-of-pocket 
costs (Dembe, Lu, & Sieck, 2010).  
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Risk Tolerance and Uncertainty 
 Even for individuals who understand the concepts of health insurance, risk tolerance, and uncertainty 
can muddle decision making. Individuals tend to have myopic preferences, meaning they overly discount 
future experiences at the expense of the present. In terms of choosing a health plan, myopic preferences 
may lead individuals to put more weight on immediate payments for monthly premiums and focus less 
attention on cost-sharing structures, which will have an effect on out-of-pocket costs when care is utilized 
in the future (Rice, 2013). Future healthcare costs are often uncertain; while health plans for year 2 are 
purchased in the end of year 1, healthcare needs for year 2 are partially unknown in year 1. Individuals 
commonly misperceive health risks either by being overconfident in their ability to avoid common 
concerns or by overvaluing their susceptibility to low probability events (Baicker et al., 2012; Tversky, 
1992). Any attempt to understand how individuals make decisions regarding health insurance must 
consider behavioral economics and theories of decision making under uncertainty to account for these 
behaviors (Rice, 2013; Schneider, 2004).  
Cost-Sharing and Utilization  
Price and Demand  
 The RAND health insurance experiment (RAND HIE) is considered the gold standard of utilization 
studies. In 1974, researchers at the RAND Corporation randomized individuals from 6 cities to 1 of 14 
health plans defined by distinct combinations of coinsurance (0%, 25%, 50%, and 95%) and out-of-pocket 
maximums (5%, 10%, or 15% percent of family income up to $1,000)  (Manning et al., 1987). The RAND 
HIE found that individuals and families with higher levels of cost-sharing utilized fewer services, but the 
forgone services were  for both high and low severity care (Manning et al., 1987).  Cost-sharing had a 
more significant effect on the number of services accessed than on the intensity of utilization and cost-
sharing had less of an effect on the cost or quantity of future services accessed in a policy year after the 
first care event had been accessed (Manning et al., 1987).  
 Another formative finding by the RAND HIE was the calculation of the price elasticity of demand for 
healthcare services of -0.2, meaning a ten-unit increase in the price of healthcare only decreased 
demand for services by 2% (Newhouse and The Insurance Experiment Group, 1993). Lu et al. found a 
similar price elasticity of demand to that calculated in the RAND study (-0.196), but found demand to be 
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more elastic at higher levels of cost-sharing (-0.31) (Lu, Frank, & McGuire, 2008). Using data from the 
RAND HIE, Gilleskie and Mroz found that for every percentage point increase in coinsurance (the 
percentage of costs paid by an insurer), health expenditures increased by an average of $6.40 (Gilleskie 
& Mroz, 2004). The price elasticity of demand in these examples was relative to total healthcare 
expenditures and not broken out for different types of care.  
 A recent study of the Chilean health system found the price elasticity for elective care (receipt of 
which is more discretionary, represented here as psychology visits, home health visits, and physical 
therapy evaluations) to be fairly elastic (price elasticity of -2.08, -1.88, and -0.32 respectively) compared 
to marker conditions (an unavoidable, urgent condition, here as gall bladder removal, arm cast setting, 
and appendectomy) for which the price elasticity was close zero  (Duarte, 2012; Basu, Friedman, & 
Burstin, 2002).  
  The RAND HIE is still considered the seminal work on how insurance generosity influences demand 
for healthcare services, however much about the healthcare landscape has changed since the RAND HIE 
was conducted. The rise and fall of managed care in the 1990’s, technological advances in medicine, 
increasing medical inflation, the ACA, and the introduction of health savings accounts and HDHPs have 
all changed the way healthcare is consumed in the United States.  
High Deductible Health Plans 
 HDHPs have been shown to lower healthcare expenditures through reductions in preference 
sensitive and low priority care, but these plans can also cause reductions in necessary care which can 
have potentially deleterious downstream effects to beneficiary health. A 2014 study used propensity score 
matching to create an analogous control group for a sample of employees who were obligated to switch 
to a HDHP. This study found that the HDHPs were associated with a reduction in outpatient care for low 
priority chronic care but not high severity care, suggesting the plan incentives were producing the 
intended outcomes. However, the study also found an association between HDHPs and a reduction in 
high priority visits for chronic conditions, which could indicate a reduction in quality of care and health 
outcomes (Reddy, Ross-Degnan, Zaslavsky, Soumerai, & Wharam, 2014). In another study of employers 
mandating employees switch to a HDHP, Fronstin and Roebuck found an immediate decrease in 
spending the year following the switch but then an increase in expenditures in subsequent years (Fronstin 
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& Roebuck, 2013). Compared to year 0 (prior to the introduction of the HDHP), in year 1 outpatient 
ambulatory care dropped 13%, outpatient office visits dropped 14%, emergency room visits dropped 
17%, and inpatient hospital visits dropped 33%; however, by year two office visits and outpatient 
ambulatory care were slightly higher than in year 0 and by year 3 emergency room visits and inpatient 
hospital visits were higher than year 0 by 8% and 30% respectively.  
 Although HDHPs have been associated with a reduction in both low and high severity care, the effect 
is always not constant across subpopulations. Wharam et al. found that HDHP reduced utilization across 
the board (including for high severity emergency room visits), but these reductions were only evident in 
low-income populations; individuals with higher levels of income responded to HDHPs as intended - by 
reducing low severity emergency room events while still accessing care for high severity events. There 
was evidence of negative health consequence on the low-income individuals in the Wharam et al. study, 
the reduction in care for high severity events in the first year of plan enrollment led to an increase in 
utilization in subsequent years, even larger than pre-HDHP rates (Wharam, Zhang, Landon, Soumerai, & 
Ross-Degnan, 2013).  A 2013 study found when their employer forced them to switch to a HDHP, men 
were more likely to have decreased utilization of all kinds while women accessed care as intended by 
decreasing low severity events but not high severity care (Kozhimannil, Law, Blauer-Peterson, Zhang, & 
Wharam, 2013).  
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CHAPTER 3: PLAN SELECTION IN THE NON-GROUP MARKET IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE 
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE 
 
Introduction  
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) established Marketplaces for health insurance where 
individuals could easily access, and choose among, qualified health plans (QHPs) from a variety of 
insurers. The ACA required that QHPs meet certain standards, such as regulations on covered benefits 
and premiums, which were not required of plans in the non-group market prior to 2014. The ACA 
mandate that all nonexempt US residents have health insurance coverage and that plans accept all 
consumers regardless of pre-existing conditions began the process of breaking down previously 
entrenched barriers to entry in the non-group health insurance market and expanded the market to new 
consumers.  
To ease the cognitive burden of selecting a QHP among Marketplace choices, the ACA required 
insurers to standardize plan offerings; however, switching insurance plans always involves costs such as 
learning about plan options and determining which plan would best match consumers’ individual needs. 
For certain subgroups of individuals in the non-group market, QHPs had lower premiums and more 
generous benefits compared to non-QHPs. To begin to understand individual decision-making, we 
analyzed the characteristics associated with plan switching and plan selection in the 2014 Marketplace. 
We hypothesized that individuals predicted to have higher healthcare costs would choose more generous 
plans, while healthier individuals would select QHPs with lower premiums. In other words, since plan 
generosity is more valuable to individuals predicted to have higher healthcare expenditures, we expect 
poorer health to be associated with purchasing more generous plans. 
Background - Changes in the Non-Group Market Under the Affordable Care Act 
Metal Level and Actuarial Value 
To standardize plans and help individuals more easily understand plan value, QHPs were 
assigned a metal level (platinum, gold, silver, or bronze) according to the plan’s actuarial value 
(Department of Health and Human Services, 2014).  The actuarial value represents the amount of 
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expected healthcare costs the issuer will pay; for example, in a plan with an actuarial value of 90% the 
beneficiary would, on average, be expected to pay 10% of overall healthcare costs. Generally, platinum 
plans have an actuarial value of 90%, gold plans have an actuarial value of 80%, silver 70% (with the 
notable exception for plans enhanced by cost sharing reductions (CSRs) that increase the actuarial value 
of silver plans for qualified low income individuals), and bronze plans have an actuarial value of 60%. 
Catastrophic plans, available to individuals under 30 and individuals who meet certain income 
qualifications, must meet ACA standards of benefits offered but can have actuarial values below 60%. 
Modified Community Rating 
Medical underwriting is a common practice used by insurers to set premiums based on an 
individual’s age, sex, past utilization, and expected health status (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012b). 
Underwritten premiums tend to be higher for individuals who are female, older, or less healthy because 
these individuals are likely to incur higher costs. Under the ACA, QHP premiums are generated through 
modified community rating, meaning they are a function only of actuarial value, region, age (with limits), 
number of dependents on the policy, and tobacco use ("The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act," 
2010). 
Federal Assistance Programs  
Some individuals may be eligible for financial assistance to increase affordability of QHPs.  With 
some exceptions, individuals with income between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL) are 
eligible for an Advanced Premium Tax Credit (APTC) which provides an immediate credit to the 
purchaser to lower their monthly premium. Individuals with income between 100% and 250% FPL who 
enroll in a silver plan may also be eligible for additional assistance through CSRs.  
Regulations on QHP Generosity and Plan Benefits 
In addition to laws governing plan pricing, the ACA dictated certain aspects of plan generosity. In 
2014, all QHPs were required to cap out-of-pocket spending within a policy year at $6,350 or lower. The 
ACA also prohibited QHPs from denying coverage for pre-existing conditions and required issuers to 
cover a set of essential health benefits (The Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight).  
Essential health benefits included a maternity rider which, unlike non-ACA-compliant plans in the non-
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group market, was included with no extra cost on all QHPs because modified community rating does not 
allow for premiums to discriminate by sex.   
Grandfathered / Transitional Plans 
 The ACA contained a provision to allow individuals enrolled in a non-group plan as of March 10, 
2010 (when the law passed) to remain in that particular plan (“Grandfathered plans”) rather than switching 
to a QHP. In 2013, it was announced that individuals who did not qualify for Grandfathered status would 
be allowed to remain in a non-ACA compliant plan in 2014 so long as they were already enrolled in a non-
group plan as of October 1, 2013 (“Transitional plans”) (Lucia, 2014). Individuals in Grandfathered or 
Transitional plans could stay in their 2013 plan or switch to a QHP; however, they could not enroll in 
another non-QHP in 2014. Grandfathered and Transitional plans were not subject to the same regulations 
required of QHPs.   
Status Quo Bias and Active Plan Selection 
Previous studies have found that individuals tend to reenroll in, rather than switch, plans 
regardless of potential cost savings (status quo bias) (Frank, 2009; Strombom et al., 2002). Evidence of 
this “status quo bias” has been observed in non-US health insurance markets (where switching health 
plans has low transaction costs) and among Medicare Part D beneficiaries (even when switching would 
result in lower premiums and out-of-pocket costs) (Hunt Kearsley et al., 2012; Lako et al., 2011; Neuman, 
2009). In the US commercial health insurance market, individuals regularly select a health plan at a fixed 
point in time, often when they start a job or incur a qualifying event (e.g. getting married or having a child). 
However, switching plans, as opposed to automatically reenrolling, requires active consumer participation 
involving seeking out and comprehending the information necessary for active decision-making (Lako et 
al., 2011; Frank, 2009).   
Conditional on the decision to switch, health plan selection is influenced by age, sex, risk 
tolerance, price, and expected healthcare utilization (K. Ericson & A. Starc, 2012; Lako et al., 2011). Risk 
tolerance and expectations of future utilization can create differences in how individuals respond to 
prices:  healthier individuals opt for cheaper, less generous plans while individuals who are less healthy 
and/or expect higher healthcare costs purchase more generous (and expensive) plans (Naessens et al., 
2008; van den Berg et al., 2008). As the non-group market continues to grow, it is important that 
  
21 
 
policymakers and industry leaders understand the interaction between price and plan generosity for 
different groups of consumers in the health insurance Marketplaces.  
In this study, we used claims data from a large insurer with high market share on the state 
exchange to explore individual characteristics associated with the decision to switch to a QHP and, 
conditional on switching, selection of metal level in a Federally Facilitated Marketplace.  We examined 
differences in the effect of APTCs on plan selection for individuals with varying risk of incurring high 
health costs. We hypothesized that individuals predicted to have higher healthcare expenditures would 
apply their tax credit towards the purchase of health plans with higher actuarial value while individuals 
predicted to have lower healthcare expenditures would focus more on premium price and purchase plans 
with lower actuarial value.  
Data and Methods 
Data and Sample 
The data come from a large insurer, which allowed for direct observation of the true cost of 
premiums and federal assistance. In 2014, this insurer was one of only two companies offering QHPs in 
the state Marketplace and the only insurer offering QHPs in every county; in 2013, it had 86% of the non-
group market (The Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts, 2013). The analytical sample included 
individuals who were: (1) enrolled in the non-group market with the insurer for at least six months of 2013 
(to ensure information was known about an individual’s health status and 2013 plan benefits); (2) 19-64 
years old as of January 1, 2014 (working age adults who do not transition to Medicare); and (3) enrolled 
as individuals in a non-group health plan with this insurer as of May 1, 2014 (May 1 was the policy start 
date for individuals who enrolled on the final day of open enrollment in 2014). We excluded individuals in: 
(1) plans exclusively serving American Indians and Catastrophic plans (criteria for enrollment were 
subject to additional qualifications) and (2) family plans or plans in which an individual was enrolled with a 
dependent or spouse (decisions made for a family unit may have differed than decisions made for a 
single individual). Claims and plan enrollment data were used for information about individuals and their 
2013 and 2014 plan benefits.    
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Outcome Variable  
The outcome variable of interest was metal level, representing the actuarial value of the selected 
plan: platinum (90% actuarial value), gold (80% actuarial value), silver (70% actuarial value), and bronze 
(60% actuarial value).     
Key Independent Variables  
Health Risk 
Risk scores have been used to represent heath status (Albert, 2006; Thomas, 2006). We used an 
episode-based health risk score generated by an Ingenix Symmetry® algorithm accounting for age, sex, 
and healthcare claims from the previous 12 months (Symmetry® Episode Treatment Groups®, 2012). 
Our model utilized the prospective risk score, which combines demographics and claims data from the 
past 12 months to calculate a risk score that predicts the risk of an individual being high cost in the 
subsequent year (Symmetry® Episode Treatment Groups®, 2012).  The risk score was standardized to 
mean=1.0 (indicating average health risk with >1.0 at higher risk of being high cost compared to the rest 
of the sample) and standard deviation=1.0.   
Characteristics of Individuals and Policies   
 Age, sex, and details of plan benefits came from claims and plan enrollment data. Age on May 1, 
2014 was categorized into three age groups (18-35, 36-50, 51-64). Also in the model was a binary 
variable for whether an individual had an APTC in 2014 as well as a continuous variable for the amount of 
the APTC (zero if no tax credit was received).  
Analysis  
The sample was comprised of two types of individuals: those who chose to remain in a 
Grandfathered / Transitional Plan in 2014 and those who chose to switch to a QHP. Our first analysis 
examined plan switching using chi-squared and t-tests to compare characteristics of switchers to non-
switchers and presents descriptive statistics on cost.  Measures of cost include monthly premiums (the 
monthly price of health insurance), deductibles (the amount the member must pay for services before the 
plan contributes), and annual out-of-pocket maximums (the maximum amount of expenditures - 
deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, etc.  – paid by the member within a year, after which the plan 
pays 100% of the cost of additional services) (Department of Health and Human Services, 2014).  
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Our second analysis used a multinomial logit model to generate estimates of the effects of 
characteristics on selection of a metal level by those who switched. When modeling plan selection among 
those who switched, we excluded individuals with CSRs. Qualified individuals were required to enroll in a 
silver plan in order to receive CSRs, which meant the decision-making process for metal level selection 
was different for these individuals. The multinomial model for this analysis included only high-risk and low-
risk individuals (Figure 1):  high-risk were individuals for whom costs were expected to be higher than 
75% of the sample while low-risk individuals were expected to have costs in the bottom 25
th
 percentile.  
We presented odds ratios (OR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI). All analyses were conducted in SAS 
Enterprise Guide 6.1 (SAS Institute, 2011). 
Results  
Switching 
Of the 96,106 individuals who met eligibility criteria, 81,187 (84%) remained in the same plan in 
which they were enrolled in 2013 (Grandfathered or Transitional) (Figure 1). Table 2 presents unadjusted, 
descriptive statistics by whether or not an individual switched to a QHP or stayed on a Grandfathered / 
Transitional plan. Individuals who switched to a QHP were more likely to have been female (64% v. 42% 
P<0.0001), older (average age 47.3 v. 44.6 P<0.0001), and had a greater risk of having higher healthcare 
costs in 2014 (mean risk score 1.168 v. 0.969 P<0.0001).  
Less Costly - Modified Community Ratings and Premium Costs 
Without tax credits, QHP premiums were, on average, more expensive than premiums for 
Grandfathered / Transitional plans. For individuals in the sample without APTCs, the average monthly 
QHP premium was $472.36, however, with APTCs the average QHP monthly premium was $205.23, 
lower than the average 2014 Transitional / Grandfathered Plan premium ($328.13) (Table 2). The 
average APTC value in this sample was $354.45, and 75% of individuals in a QHP received an APTC.  
More Generous - QHP Regulations and Plan Generosity 
The same subgroups that would have been most likely to benefit from modified community rating 
(women, older individuals, and higher predicted costs) also would have been most likely to benefit from 
ACA regulations on QHP benefits. In general, QHPs were more generous than Grandfathered / 
Transitional Plans; the average actuarial value for QHPs was significantly higher than the 2014 actuarial 
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value for Grandfathered / Transitional Plans (87.5% v. 60.3% P <0.0001).  Compared to individuals with 
lower cost sharing in 2013, a higher percentage of individuals in less generous 2013 plans switched to 
QHPs in 2014. Individuals who switched to QHPs had higher 2013 out-of-pocket maximums (OOP max) 
(50% of those in QHPs had OOP max >$6,000 in 2013 v. 39% of individuals who were in Grandfathered / 
Transitional plans in 2014, P<0.0001) and higher deductibles (82.5% of those in QHPs had 2013 
deductibles between $1,000 and $6,000 and 4.5% had 2013 deductibles >$6,000 v. 79% and 2.7% for 
those in 2014 Grandfathered/Transitional plans, P<0.0001) (Table 2).   
Decision-Making among Beneficiaries who Switched Plans:  Choice of Metal Level 
Plan selection was modeled separately for 1,691 high-risk (cut-off risk score = 1.287) and 1,692 
low-risk (cut-off risk score = 0.392) individuals (Figure 2). High-risk individuals were older (51.0 v. 40.4, 
P<0.0001), more likely to be female (69% v. 61%, P<0.0001), and had higher average APTCs ($153.75 v. 
$124.97, P<0.0001). Compared to low-risk individuals, high-risk individuals were less likely to select 
bronze plans (15.2% v. 35.7%, P<0.0001) and more likely to select platinum (22.1% v. 10.4%, P<0.0001) 
and gold plans (28.5% v. 20.8%, P<0.0001) (Table 3).  
Effect of APTC on Metal Level 
Both high and low-risk individuals with APTCs had lower odds of selecting a platinum or gold plan 
over a silver plan compared to individuals without a tax credit (high-risk, platinum: OR = 0.25, CI: 0.19-
0.33; high-risk, gold: OR =0.45, CI: 0.35-0.57; low-risk, platinum: OR= 0.44, CI: 0.30-0.63; low-risk, gold: 
OR=0.98, CI: 0.77-1.26). Compared to high-risk individuals without APTCs, high-risk individuals with 
APTCs had lower odds of selecting a bronze plan over a silver plan (OR=0.40, CI: 0.30-0.55). The 
opposite was true for low-risk individuals, compared to those without APTCs, low-risk individuals with 
APTCs had higher odds of selecting a bronze plan over a silver plan (OR =1.35, CI: 1.09- 1.66) (Table 4).    
Effect of Demographics on Metal Level  
Compared to individuals age 36-50, younger individuals (age 18-35; both high-risk and low-risk 
without tax credits) had increased odds of selecting a platinum or gold plan over a silver plan (high-risk, 
platinum: OR = 1.45, CI: 1.18-1.79; high-risk, gold: OR =1.27, CI: 1.04-1.56; low-risk, platinum: OR= 2.00, 
CI: 1.63-2.45; low-risk, gold: OR=1.42, CI: 1.21-1.66). There was no statistically significant effect of being 
younger on selecting a bronze plan. Compared to individuals age 36-50, older individuals (age 51-65; 
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both high-risk and low-risk without tax credits) had lower odds of selecting a platinum or gold plan over a 
silver plan (high-risk, platinum: OR =0.32, CI: 0.17-0.39; high-risk, gold: OR =0.48, CI: 0.40-0.56; low-risk, 
platinum: OR= 0.03, CI: 0.02-0.05; low-risk, gold: OR=0.13, CI: 0.10-0.17). Low-risk, older individuals 
without APTCs had lower odds of selecting a bronze plan over a silver plan compared to low-risk 
individuals age 36-50 without a APTCs (OR =0.71, CI: 0.58-0.86) while age had no effect on the odds of 
selecting a bronze or silver plan for high-risk individuals between the ages of 36 and 65 without APTCs 
(OR =1.22, CI: 0.99-1.51) (Table 4).    
Discussion 
The health insurance Marketplaces reduced barriers to enrollment in non-group health plans; in 
2013 there were 8.5 million individuals in the non-group market and by 2015 that number had grown to 
17.9 million (Carman et al., 2015a). Using claims from an insurer with high market share in the non-group 
market, we provide evidence to support our hypothesis that individuals would break status quo bias if the 
alternative plans were less expensive and/or more generous. Individuals who would benefit most from 
modified community ratings and regulations imposed on QHPs were more likely to switch. Individuals who 
switched to a QHP were more likely to be female, older, and at higher risk for being high cost. To 
decouple the influence of alternative plans being less costly and more generous, we conducted a 
multinomial model of plan selection for the highest and lowest risk individuals. As hypothesized, receipt of 
APTCs was associated with selecting more generous plans for high-risk individuals and less generous 
plans for low-risk individuals.  Contrary to prior studies which found older individuals to be less price 
sensitive, our results found older individuals were more likely to select less costly plans. This finding may 
suggest unintended consequences of age based pricing. 
Effect of APTCs on Metal Level 
Low-risk individuals with APTCs had higher odds of selecting a bronze plan than a silver plan 
compared to low-risk individuals who did not receive APTCs.  As hypothesized, healthier individuals who 
expect to use fewer healthcare services selected plans with lower actuarial value and lower premiums. 
This finding suggests low-risk individuals were more likely to switch health plans because QHPs were 
less costly; rather than applying their tax credit towards the purchase of a more generous health plan, 
they used the APTC to save money on health insurance, which they could then spend on other goods 
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and services. Individuals who qualify for an APTC would be lower income and therefore may be more 
concerned about the premium price than the actuarial value of the plan.   
High-risk individuals with APTCs had lower odds of selecting a bronze plan over a silver plan 
compared to high-risk individuals without APTCs; this may suggest that these individuals are using their 
tax credit on more generous health insurance, prioritizing that choice over spending their income on other 
goods.  Individuals at risk for higher healthcare expenditures would be willing to spend more in premiums 
for a plan with higher actuarial value.  The APTCs would make the silver plans affordable so these 
individuals would be more likely to choose silver over bronze plans; however, without APTCs, some high-
risk individuals may have been priced out of plans with actuarial values above bronze.  
Age and Metal Level 
Controlling for receipt of APTCs and being at risk of higher expenditures, older individuals had 
lower odds of selecting a platinum or gold plan over a silver plan. This is surprising given prior work 
suggesting that older individuals are less price sensitive than younger individuals (K. Ericson & A. Starc, 
2012). However, without tax credits, premiums for more generous plans may have been too high for older 
individuals; premiums for older individuals can be up to three times as large as those for younger 
individuals ("The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act," 2010). Older individuals, and those 
predicted to have incurred more costs, were more likely to switch to a QHP in 2014, but perhaps without 
tax credits the premiums on gold and platinum QHPs were high enough to deter older individuals, even 
those who are high-risk (D. Cutler, Lincoln, & Zeckhauser, 2010; Lore et al., 2012).  
Limitations  
 There are several limitations of our study. First, we lack a good proxy measure for income. Income 
for individuals in a 2014 QHP could be roughly imputed from receipt of various levels of federal 
assistance, but eligibility was unknown for individuals who did not switch. We explored income variables 
at the census tract level (Kozhimannil et al., 2013; Reddy et al., 2014; Wharam et al., 2013); however, 
these variables did not correlate with what we knew about income for individuals in our sample with CSR 
and APTC. Without adequate indicators of income, we were unable to estimate who would have been 
eligible for federal assistance but declined to take advantage of these programs by not switching to a 
QHP. Additionally, the dataset only included tax credits received at the time plans were purchased 
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(APTCs), when individuals opted to defer receipt of tax credits until the income tax filing date credits were 
not observed. Second, generalizability was limited because we studied beneficiaries enrolled with one 
particular insurer in both 2013 and 2014; however this insurer had a significantly large market share of 
the State’s non-group health insurance beneficiaries (The Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts, 
2013). Finally, individuals who were new to the insurance market in 2014 may have exhibited different 
behaviors that those in our sample.  Individuals with CSR also may have behaved differently but they 
were also were excluded from the sample. The focus of this analysis was the effect of the APTC on metal 
level. A majority of individuals eligible for CSR would have selected silver plans because, had they 
selected another metal level, they would have been ineligible for the subsidy.  Additionally, CSR 
recipients are very low income (100%-250% FPL), which also may also have affected plan selection.   
Conclusions 
The Marketplace allows (and the ACA requires) everyone in the US who is not otherwise exempt 
to purchase a health plan or pay a penalty. Receipt of APTCs influenced behavior in the plan selection 
process and had different effects depending on predicted future healthcare expenditures. Plans with low 
actuarial value have been criticized for not offering individuals’ sufficient financial security and adequate 
access to care.  However, considering consumers operate under a fixed budget for health insurance and 
all other goods, for some individuals who expect low healthcare spending over the following year, a plan 
with lower actuarial value may provide adequate benefits and access while allowing them to purchase 
other needed and desired goods and services. For individuals at risk of high healthcare costs, APTCs 
allow individuals to purchase plans with higher actuarial value than would otherwise have been 
affordable.   
Healthcare costs are projected to rise, and with increased healthcare costs comes increases in 
premiums (CBO, 2015). Future studies of plan selection should look at the effects of increased premiums 
on plan selection. If average premiums increase more than the second lowest cost silver plan (on which 
APTCs are calculated), then the APTCs will be lower relative to the average premium, guiding low income 
individuals, even less healthy individuals, into low cost silver or bronze plans (Taylor, Saltzman, Bauhoff, 
Pacula, & Eibner, 2015). Additionally, studies should be conducted to determine how price sensitivity and 
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plan selection affect utilization and health status. Even within a metal level, plans can have different levels 
of cost sharing which can impact utilization and out-of-pocket costs (Lore et al., 2012).   
Individuals on non-group plans in 2013 may have opted not to switch to a QHP in 2014 for a 
variety of reasons, one of which may have been overcoming the inertia of status quo bias. Considering 
the number of uninsured individuals has been decreasing (Carman et al., 2015a), studies of switching 
plans and overcoming status quo bias will be of increasing importance as the consumer-driven 
Marketplaces for non-group health insurance continue to grow.   
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Tables and Figures  
 
Figure 1: Sample Inclusion 
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Table 2: Aim 1 Unadjusted Summary Statistics by 2014 Plan Type 
* = p<0.001 
  
  Qualified 
Health Plan 
Transitional / 
Grandfathered 
    
N  14,919  81,187  
    
Average 2014 Premium (without the application of APTC)  $  472.89*  $ 328.46 
Average 2014 Premium (with the application of APTC)  $  205.23*  $ 328.46 
Average Actuarial Value of 2014 Plan  0.875* 0.603  
Established with a Primary Care Provider in 2013  76%* 66% 
Health Risk Score (standardized)  1.168*  0.969 
Average Age  47.3*  44.6  
Percent Female  64%* 42% 
Competition from other insurers in the region  29%* 32% 
Median Household Income ($, census)  $53,300*  $55,500 
Deductible Between $1,000 and $6,000 (2013)  82.5%* 79% 
Deductible over $6,000 (2013)  4.5%* 2.7% 
 Out-of-Pocket Maximum above $6,000 (2013)  49.5%* 39% 
APTC = Applied Premium Tax Credit 
  
 
 
Table 3: Aim 1 Summary Stats by Health Risk and Metal Level 
 
  
High-Risk Low-Risk 
 
Platinum Gold Silver Bronze Total  Platinum Gold Silver Bronze Total 
Metal 
Level 
22.1% 28.5% 34.2% 15.2% 1,692 
Metal 
Level 
10.4% 20.8% 33.1% 35.7% 1,691 
Age 
between 
18 and 35 
32.8% 32.1% 27.2% 7.8% 
268 
15.8% 
Age 
between 
18 and 35 
15.0% 25.6% 33.4% 26.1% 
767 
45.4% 
Age 
between 
36 and 50 
27.1% 30.1% 31.8% 11.0% 
365 
21.6% 
Age 
between 
36 and 50 
10.4% 22.8% 35.9% 30.9% 
460 
27.2% 
Age 
between 
51 and 64 
17.7% 27.0% 36.7% 18.6% 
1,059 
62.6% 
Age 
between 
51 and 64 
2.8% 11.0% 30.0% 56.3% 
464 
27.4% 
Female 22.0% 29.0% 34.4% 14.6% 
1,175 
69.4% 
Female 10.1% 21.6% 35.5% 32.9% 
1,038 
61.4% 
APTC 21.3% 31.9% 31.6% 15.2% 
769 
45.5% 
APTC 9.0% 20.4% 22.0% 48.5% 
763 
45.1% 
APTC = Applied Premium Tax Credit 
3
1
  
 
 
  
 
 
Table 4: Aim 1 Multinomial Model Results (Referent Outcome is Silver) 
  High-Risk 
(N = 1,692) 
 Low-Risk 
(N = 1,691) 
 Outcome  Odds Ratios (95%Confidence Intervals)   Odds Ratios (95%Confidence Intervals) 
Female Platinum 0.900  (0.777-1.042)  0.798 (0.664 - 0.959)  
Female Gold 1.023  (0.893 -1.172)  0.971 (0.839 – 1.124)  
Female Bronze 0.888  (0.758 -1.040)  0.755 (0.666 - 0.856)  
Age 18-35 Platinum 1.453  (1.181 -1.787)   1.997 (1.629 – 2.448) 
Age 18-35 Gold 1.273  (1.038 -1.562)   1.419  (1.211 – 1.662) 
Age 18-35 Bronze 0.842 (0.621-1.139)  1.070 (0.922-1.243) 
Age  36-50 Platinum REF  REF 
Age 36-50 Gold REF  REF 
Age 36-50 Bronze REF  REF 
Age 51+ Platinum 0.321 (0.268-0.385)  0.029 (0.017-0.049) 
Age 51+ Gold 0.475 (0.402-0.561)  0.129 (0.096-0.174) 
Age 51+ Bronze 1.221 (0.991-1.506)  0.707 (0.579-0.863) 
APTC (binary) Platinum 0.254  (0.194 -0.333)  0.436 (0.303 - 0.627)  
APTC (binary) Gold 0.449  (0.354 – 0.570)  0.984 (0.767 – 1.264)  
APTC (binary) Bronze 0.403  (0.296 – 0.548)  1.345 (1.088 – 1.664)  
APTC amount Platinum 1.006  (1.005 - 1.007)  1.010 (1.009 - 1.012)  
APTC amount Gold 1.004  (1.004 - 1.005)  1.006 (1.005 - 1.007)  
APTC amount Bronze 1.003  (1.002 – 1.004)   1.004 (1.004 - 1.005)  
     
N Platinum 374  176 
N Gold 482  352 
N Bronze 258  603 
APTC = Applied Premium Tax Credit 
REF = Referent Category  
3
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CHAPTER 4: INTRA-YEAR VARIATION IN THE MARGINAL COST OF CARE AND ITS EFFECT ON 
UTILIZATION 
 
Introduction  
Health insurance plans use beneficiary cost-sharing to reduce moral hazard in the health 
insurance market. Moral hazard assumes that when individuals are shielded from the full costs of 
healthcare services, they exhibit less discretion in their demand for care, resulting in overconsumption 
(Aron-Dine et al., 2013; Arrow, 1963). Cost-sharing through deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, or 
annual spending caps refers to the portion of healthcare costs for which the beneficiary is responsible. 
Traditional health plans, such as preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and point of service (POS) 
plans, often use copayments to encourage routine outpatient visits instead of more costly inpatient 
admissions when possible. Increasingly, high deductible health plans (HDHP) are being offered. HDHPs 
encourage individuals to take more responsibility for healthcare by imposing larger deductibles (>$1,250) 
before plans help pay for services (Buntin et al., 2006; Internal Revenue Service, 2015).   
Past studies suggest that utilization increases when patients have lower out-of-pocket costs. Notably, the 
RAND health insurance experiment found beneficiaries with zero cost-sharing had a higher outpatient 
utilization rate than those responsible for 95% of the cost of outpatient services (Manning et al., 1987). 
From the beneficiary perspective, cost-sharing can lead to nonlinearities in the price of care. As 
beneficiaries consume more care and incur costs, they may reach their deductible or annual spending 
limits, after which the price of an additional unit of care changes. In this study we utilize a large dataset 
containing the costs of services and a monthly indicator of health status to examine the intra-year effect of 
nonlinearities in cost-sharing from the perspective of a beneficiary in the non-group market.  
 We focused on ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs), conditions for which timely access to 
quality outpatient care can often prevent emergency room (ER) and inpatient visits. Specifically, we 
examined how a change in the marginal out-of-pocket cost, due to nonlinearities in plan benefits, would 
affect utilization of outpatient services for ACSCs. Additionally, controlling for the marginal out-of-pocket 
cost, we explored the effect of recent outpatient services on potentially avoidable ER and inpatient visits. 
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We hypothesized that: (1) individuals would be more likely to receive outpatient care when their marginal 
out-of-pocket cost was lower, and (2) controlling for the beneficiary’s cost responsibilities, individuals with 
a recent outpatient visit would have fewer ER and inpatient visits.  
Data and Methods 
Data and Sample 
The data for this study come from a large insurer in the southeastern United States. Typically, 
insurers do not release contractually-negotiated reimbursement rates, but this dataset included the price 
of care for all services, including the cost of care to the beneficiary and to the plan. Using 2014 claims 
data, we analyzed all utilization and costs attributable to each beneficiary in our sample. 
The analytical sample included individuals who were: (1) enrolled in the non-group market for at 
least six months of 2014 (to ensure they were enrolled long enough to observe use of care); (2) between 
the ages of 18 and 64 as of January 1, 2014 (working age adults who do not transition to Medicare); and 
(3) diagnosed with asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), diabetes, hypertension, heart 
failure, and/or coronary heart disease. We excluded individuals on: (1) plans exclusively serving 
American Indians or Alaskan Natives as those plans frequently have zero-cost-sharing arrangements, 
and (2) family plans or plans with a dependent or spouse, as they have family deductibles and annual 
spending maximums that may change the effect of cost-sharing. Plans in the non-group market include 
those that were compliant with the requirements of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and grandfathered or 
transitional plans, which did not adhere to ACA regulations.  
Measures 
Outcome Variables  
Three outcome variables were used to capture healthcare utilization related to ACSCs. Outpatient 
visits for ACSCs were used as a measure of access to routine care, whereas ER and inpatient visits were 
used as indicators of potentially preventable utilization. Outpatient visits included wellness visits, office 
visits for evaluation and management (E&M), and imaging and lab tests by a primary care provider or 
specialist. Also included were office visits not directly coded as E&M but related to asthma, COPD, 
diabetes, hypertension, and/or heart disease identified by ICD-9 codes (International Classification of 
Diseases, 9th revision, Clinical Modification, (Agency for Health Research and Quality, 2015)). ER visits 
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were defined by claims filed for visits to the ER that did not result in an inpatient stay; ER visits resulting in 
an admission were considered inpatient visits. Both ER and inpatient visits of interest were identified 
using the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Prevention Quality Indicators (PQIs). 
PQIs have be used to indicate the adequacy of access to outpatient care in communities (Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2001). We focused on nine PQIs representing the focal chronic 
conditions of the analytic sample: asthma/COPD, diabetes, hypertension, heart failure, and coronary 
heart disease. Each outcome was dichotomized (1= presence of > 1 visit in any given month and 
0=absence of visit in a given month).   
Key Independent Variables  
Marginal Out-of-Pocket Cost  
 The key explanatory variable was the marginal out-of-pocket cost, defined as the proportion of 
the total payment to the provider borne by the beneficiary at the beginning of each month. Specifically, it 
was operationalized by comparing cumulative beneficiary liability to-date to the beneficiary’s plan 
benefits. To calculate the monthly marginal out-of-pocket cost, we determined whether a beneficiary’s 
annual deductible had been met at the end of the month. Until that point, a beneficiary would face the full 
cost of care (marginal out-of-pocket cost=1). Once the deductible was met, the marginal out-of-pocket 
cost changed to a fraction reflecting the level of coinsurance defined by the plan benefits (in this sample: 
0.00, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, or 0.50). When a member’s total in-network liability reached or surpassed the 
annual spending limit (if it existed), the marginal out-of-pocket cost dropped to “0” for the remainder of the 
year (i.e., individual was not responsible for any costs of additional care). While the marginal out-of-
pocket cost for out-of-network care may be different, less than 5% of all visits in this sample were out-of-
network. As such, we assumed the marginal out-of-pocket cost aligned with in-network deductibles, 
coinsurance, copayments, and maximum annual limits. Because of delays between utilization and claims 
filing, individuals may not immediately have been aware of their current liability so a one month lag was 
introduced to the marginal out-of-pocket cost variable. For example, if an individual reached their 
deductible anytime in May, the variable recognized this milestone July 1.  
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Health Status  
 Risk scores have been used to reflect heath status (Albert, 2006; Thomas, 2006). We used an 
episode-based health risk score generated by an Ingenix Symmetry® algorithm accounting for age, 
gender, and healthcare claims from the previous twelve months (Symmetry® Episode Treatment 
Groups®, 2012). The score represents the risk that an individual will be less or more costly than the rest 
of the sample due to being more or less healthy. The score was standardized across the sample to an 
annual mean and standard deviation of 1. A score of 1 indicated an average health risk; scores above 1 
suggested that an individual was at higher risk of being more costly (less healthy) than the rest of the 
sample. The health risk score for each individual was updated in every month of enrollment to reflect 
changes in health status throughout the year. 
Months Enrolled    
 The marginal out-of-pocket cost variable was a function of the cost of care used to-date, namely 
individuals who were enrolled on a plan for a longer amount of time most likely would have utilized more 
care to-date. We controlled for length of enrollment over the year by creating a binary indicator, updated 
monthly, for whether or not an individual had been enrolled for less than seven months (e.g. in July, 
individuals who enrolled in January had a value of 1, while individuals who enrolled in February or March 
had a value of 0). By decoupling the effects of time from cost, we are better able to isolate the effect of 
changes in the marginal out-of-pocket cost on utilization throughout the year. 
Analysis 
The Model  
 The general form of the model is the same across all outcome variables.  There are four main 
input variables, each defined at the person-month level: (1) the marginal out-of-pocket cost 
(operationalized as three binary indicators for whether the marginal out-of-pocket cost was zero, one, or 
equal to the coinsurance); (2) health risk, updated monthly, operationalized as both a continuous variable 
and quadratic term, (3) a binary indicator for whether the observation occurred in the first six months of 
enrollment, and (4) (when the outcome was ER or inpatient visits) an indicator of whether or not an 
individual had an outpatient visit in the previous three months.     
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Yim = β1(marginal out-of-pocket cost=0; REF) im + β2(marginal out-of-pocket cost=other) im + β3(marginal 
out-of-pocket cost=1)im + β4(health risk)im + β5(health risk)
2
im + β6(first six months of enrollment)im + 
β7(outpatient visit in the past three months)im + αi + ε 
* REF = referent group  
We estimated a series of fixed effects models with binary outcome variables. Because time-
invariant, unobserved factors (such as risk aversion or care-seeking tendencies) may influence utilization, 
we included individual-specific fixed effects that control for these characteristics. Fixed effects models 
only estimate the effects of variables that have within-person variation or which change over time for an 
individual; because there is no (or limited) variation in traditional explanatory variables (e.g., age, gender), 
these variables are not needed in the model. Using only within-person variation effectively controls for 
these traditional explanatory variables by allowing individuals to serve as their own control over the time 
period while their marginal cost of care varies  (Thiebaud, Patel, & Nichol, 2008).  The model was 
estimated in SAS Enterprise Guide 6.1 (SAS Institute, 2011).  Following Zou (2013), we estimated the 
models using a Poisson distribution with a log link to allow the coefficient to be interpreted as risk ratios 
(RR) rather than odds ratios (G. Zou, 2004; G. Y. Zou & Donner, 2013).  This distinction is most relevant 
for outpatient events; when events are rare (such as emergency room and inpatient visits) odds ratios will 
approximate RRs; however, when events are more common the odds tends to overestimate the risk.  
Subgroup analysis 
We conducted a subgroup analysis stratified by whether or not an individual had a copayment for 
outpatient or ER visits. No plans had copayments for inpatient admissions. Most PPO and POS plans had 
copayments for outpatient care, meaning beneficiaries paid only a pre-specified amount for that visit; 
occasionally services rendered in this setting were not eligible for the copayment and therefore subject to 
the deductible. Most beneficiaries (94.4%) with outpatient copayments also had ER copayments. 
Copayments for outpatient visits ranged from $5 to $45 and ER visits from $100 to $250. Twelve percent 
of beneficiaries in the sample had no copayments for any services and all services were subject to the 
deductible; 90% of individuals with no copayments had HDHPs, meaning deductibles above $1,250 and 
the ability to save money in a health savings account (Internal Revenue Service, 2015).   
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Results 
 The analytical sample included 59,583 beneficiaries with 632,722 person-months (Table 5). 
Approximately 65% of the sample was new to this insurer in 2014. The sample was slightly more female 
(56%) with a mean age of 51; 76% never reached their deductible within the year. The health risk score 
was skewed to the right; the median health risk was 0.82. The risk scores in this sample ranged from 0.31 
to 30.06.   
Outpatient Visits  
 When the marginal out-of-pocket cost was 1, 36% of the sample had at least one outpatient visit 
(Table 6). When an individual reached their annual spending limit and the marginal out-of-pocket cost of 
accessing an additional service was 0, the likelihood of an outpatient visit increased (RR: 1.104, CI: 
1.088-1.119; Table 7), controlling for health status and the duration of policy enrollment. Compared to 
individuals for whom all outpatient visits were subject to the deductible, a higher percentage of 
beneficiaries with copayments for most outpatient services had >1 outpatient visits when the marginal 
out-of-pocket cost was 0 (37% versus 29%, Table 6). The effect of reaching the annual spending limit 
was smaller for individuals with copayments for most outpatient services (RR=1.095, CI: 1.079-1.111 
versus RR=1.265, CI: 1.204-1.328; Table 7).  
Emergency Room Visits 
 ER visits attributed to ACSCs were rare: when the marginal out-of-pocket cost was 1, 1.07% of 
individuals had an ER visit (Table 6). Having had a recent outpatient visit was associated with an 
increased likelihood of an ER visit (RR=1.377, CI: 1.285-1.475; Table 8). Compared to individuals for 
whom all ER costs were subject to the deductible, a higher percentage of individuals with ER copayments 
had >1 ER visits when the marginal out-of-pocket cost was 1 (1.1%, versus 0.7%; Table 6). Reaching the 
annual spending limit increased the risk of ER visits for individuals with ER copayments (RR=1.124, CI: 
1.027-1.423; Table 8) but not for individuals for whom all ER visits were subject to the deductible.  
Inpatient Visits 
 The percentage of individuals with an inpatient admission attributed to an ACSC was 0.3% (Table 6). 
Overall, having reached annual spending limits was associated with a decrease in the likelihood of an 
inpatient visit (RR=0.799, CI: 0.702-0.909; Table 9). Having a recent outpatient visit was associated with 
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an increased likelihood of an inpatient admission (RR=1.303, CI: 1.144-1.484; Table 9). The marginal out-
of-pocket cost had a similar effect on inpatient admissions for individuals with and without outpatient 
copayments; however, having had a recent outpatient visit is only statistically significant for individuals 
with outpatient copayments (RR=1.374, CI: 1.195-1.581; Table 9).  
Discussion and Policy Implications   
Cost-sharing is intended to encourage individuals to be more deliberate in their utilization 
decisions – not to discourage them from obtaining needed care. This is critical because failing to obtain 
necessary care can lead to acute complications and costly ER visits and hospitalizations, especially for 
those with ACSCs (Bindman et al., 1995; Decker, Schappert, & Sisk, 2009).  To-date, most studies on 
cost-sharing and utilization have examined differences across health plans or within an insurer across 
multiple years (Reddy et al., 2014; Borah, Burns, & Shah, 2011; Kephart, Skedgel, Sketris, Grootendorst, 
& Hoar, 2007; Maciejewski, Liu, Kavee, & Olsen, 2012; Trivedi, Moloo, & Mor, 2010). We extended 
previous research by capitalizing on a rich insurer dataset that included actual prices of services and 
monthly health risk. As hypothesized, decreases in marginal out-of-pocket cost were associated with 
increases in outpatient visits. Notably, we did not find the same effect on ER or inpatient visits. The 
findings of this study are consistent with prior work on the effect of cost on utilization; this study’s focus on 
the growing non-group insurance market contributes new information to the literature.      
High Deductible Health Plans  
HDHPs have been referred to as a “blunt instrument” because they are associated with a 
decrease in utilization across all types of services without distinguishing between lower cost outpatient 
care and higher cost inpatient services  (Department of Health and Human Services, 2014; Kozhimannil 
et al., 2013; Reddy et al., 2014; Reed et al., 2009; Wharam et al., 2013; Xin, 2015).  We found that a 
lower percentage of individuals with HDHPs (deductibles over $1,250, access to an HSA, and no 
copayments for outpatient care) use any services regardless of the marginal cost (Table 6). 
Having a marginal out-of-pocket cost of 0 increased the likelihood of an ER visit for individuals 
with ER copayments but had no effect on ER visits for those without ER copayments. These findings 
could indicate that individuals without ER copayments are more conscious of the cost of ER visits and 
have an overall lower preference for care in this setting. It is important to note that individuals self-select 
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plans in the non-group market so it is likely that individuals who enrolled on a HDHP did so anticipating 
using less care.  
The Role of Outpatient Care 
There is some debate over whether outpatient and inpatient visits are complements or substitutes 
(Kaestner & Lo Sasso, 2015; Manning et al., 1987). The former suggests that individuals who access any 
healthcare service will be more likely to access additional services due to provider preferences or supply-
side demand (Fisher et al., 2003; Kaestner & Lo Sasso, 2015). The substitution perspective argues that 
individuals will use outpatient services to maintain chronic conditions, rather than waiting until an 
exacerbation requires costly ER or inpatient visits. Contrary to our hypothesis, having an outpatient visit 
within the prior three months was associated with an increased likelihood of an ACSC-related ER or 
inpatient visit, suggesting they are complements. These results suggest that utilizing outpatient care may 
increase, rather than decrease, healthcare costs over the year.  
Limitations  
There were several limitations of this study. We focused on ACSCs among beneficiaries of a 
single insurer.  Moreover, we restricted our sample to individuals with certain chronic diseases, and our 
outcomes included only selected PQIs. For these reasons, generalizability is limited. Also, our study 
period was one year. Other studies have found that when individuals were assigned to a HDHP by their 
employer they initially reduced utilization across all types of care, but then increased ER and inpatient 
visits in subsequent years (Fronstin & Roebuck, 2013; Wharam et al., 2013). It is possible that study 
findings would be different over a longer time period.   
If an individual received a health shock that affected both the marginal out-of-pocket cost and 
required additional services, receipt of that follow-up care may appear to be motivated by the change in 
the marginal out-of-pocket cost rather than by doctors’ decisions. However, we controlled for health status 
with inclusion of the health risk score variable, which was updated in every month of enrollment. As 
expected, the health risk variable controlled for the effect of poor health on increased utilization (Tables 7-
9). 
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Conclusions  
 Changes in the marginal out-of-pocket cost due to nonlinearities of plan benefit design affect how 
individuals with ACSCs utilize healthcare services. Although routine outpatient services may not decrease 
the likelihood of ER or inpatient visits within a year, maintenance of chronic conditions is still critical to 
prevent potentially avoidable, costly services in subsequent years. Understanding how individuals in the 
non-group market respond to nonlinearities resulting from cost-sharing arrangements is of growing 
importance with recent health reform efforts including the expansion of the health insurance marketplaces 
and the rising popularity of HDHPs. 
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Tables 
Table 5: Aim 2 Summary Statistics 
  
 
 Frequency  Percent 
Under 50  20,739 35% 
Female 33,566 56% 
New to this insurers 38,554 65% 
ACA compliant plan 38,454 65% 
Disease Conditions (not mutually exclusive)   
     Asthma / COPD 17,092 29% 
     Diabetes 18,370 31% 
     Heart Conditions 8,261 14% 
     Hypertension 32,910 55% 
Plan Types    
     Outpatient and ER Copayments 49,239 83% 
     Outpatient Copayments Only 3,344 6% 
     HDHP 6,271 11% 
     No Copayments (not HDHP) 729 1% 
Coinsurance Level   
     Coinsurance (20%) 10,997 18% 
     Coinsurance (30%) 39,196 66% 
     Coinsurance (40%) 1,005 2% 
     Coinsurance (50%) 1,575 3% 
     No Coinsurance 6,810 11% 
Total 59,583  
 
ACA = Affordable Care Act 
COPD = Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
ER = Emergency Room  
HDHP = High Deducible Health Plan 
  
 
 
Table 6: Aim 2 Key Independent Variables by Marginal Price 
 
*Generally on PPO and POS plans, copayments are the only charges associated with outpatient services, however because some services, or 
portions of those services, might not be eligible for copayments, individuals with copayments have a marginal cost of 1 until they meet their 
deductible.   
  
 
Entire Sample Plan has Copayments for OP Visits* 
Plan has No Copayments for OP 
Visits 
(High Deductible Health Plans) 
Marginal Cost of Care 1 Other 0 1 Other 0 1 Other 0 
Had Outpatient Visit in the 
month? (percent) 
36.11% 51.35% 58.83% 37.15% 52.16% 59.67% 28.57% 43.13% 55.02% 
Emergency Room Visits 
(percent) 
1.07% 1.28% 2.22% 1.13% 1.30% 2.42% 0.66% 1.08% 1.29% 
Inpatient Visits (percent) 0.30% 0.60% 1.11% 0.31% 0.63% 1.17% 0.26% 0.35% 0.87% 
Health Risk (mean) 0.86 1.66 2.1 0.88 1.71 2.13 0.76 1.12 1.97 
Health Risk (median) 0.66 1.23 1.5 0.68 1.28 1.52 0.57 0.83 1.42 
Enrolled more than six 
months (mean) 
40% 64% 70% 39% 66% 69% 42% 48% 76% 
Sample Size 
 
N = 59,583 
 N = 52,583 N = 7,000 
4
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Table 7: Risk Ratios for Receipt of At Least One Outpatient Visit in a Month 
 
*Generally on PPO and POS plans, copayments are the only charges associated with outpatient services, however because some services, or 
portions of those services, might not be eligible for copayments, individuals with copayments have a marginal cost of 1 until they meet their 
deductible.   
 
  
 Entire Sample Plan has Copayments for OP Visits* 
 
Plan has No Copayments for OP Visits 
(High Deductible Health Plans) 
 Risk Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Risk Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Risk Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Marginal Cost of Care (1) REF REF REF 
Marginal Cost of Care (Other) 
1.063 
(1.046 - 1.080 ) 
1.044 
(1.027  - 1.061) 
1.290 
(1.209 - 1.377) 
Marginal Cost of Care (0) 
1.104 
(1.088 - 1.119 ) 
1.095 
(1.079 - 1.111) 
1.265 
(1.204 - 1.328) 
Health Risk  
1.756 
(1.711 - 1.802) 
1.752 
(1.709 - 1.796) 
1.680 
(1.498 - 1.884) 
Health Risk (squared) 
0.949 
(0.945 - 0.954) 
0.949 
(0.945 - 0.953) 
0.957 
(0.939 - 0.975) 
Enrolled more than six months  
0.967 
(0.961 - 0.973) 
0.965 
(0.958 - 0.971) 
0.996 
(0.975 - 1.017) 
 Sample Size 
 
N = 59, 583 
 
N = 52,583 
 
N = 7,000 
OP = Outpatient  
All models include individual fixed effects 
95% confidence intervals (CI) in parenthesis  
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Table 8: Risk Ratios for Receipt of Emergency Room Visits in a Month 
 
 
 
  
 Overall 
 
Plan has Copayments for ER Visits 
Plan has No Copayments for ER Visits 
(High Deductible Health Plans) 
 Risk Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Risk Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Risk Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Marginal Cost of Care (1) REF REF REF 
Marginal Cost of Care (Other) 
0.740 
(0.659 - 0.831) 
0.706 
(0.626- 0.796) 
1.246 
(0.820 - 1.893) 
Marginal Cost of Care (0) 
1.080 
(0.990- 1.178) 
1.124 
(1.027- 1.230) 
1.004 
(0.749- 1.346) 
Had an OP visit in the past three months  
1.377 
(1.285 - 1.475) 
1.326 
(1.237 - 1.423) 
1.610 
(1.281 - 2.023) 
Health Risk  
2.000 
(1.819 - 2.198) 
2.080 
(1.914 - 2.260) 
1.554 
(1.312 - 1.841) 
Health Risk (squared) 
0.952 
(0.940 - 0.965) 
0.947 
(0.935 - 0.958) 
0.984 
(0.968 - 1.000) 
Enrolled more than six months  
0.812 
(0.773 - 0.852) 
0.812 
(0.772 - 0.855) 
0.856 
(0.724 - 1.012) 
Sample Size 
 
N = 59, 583 
 
N = 49,239 
 
N = 10,344 
ER = Emergency Room 
OP = Outpatient  
All models include individual fixed effects 
95% confidence intervals (CI) in parenthesis 
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Table 9: Risk Ratios for Receipt of Inpatient Visits in a Month 
  
 Entire Sample 
 
Plan has Copayments for OP 
Visits* 
Plan has No Copayments for OP Visits 
(High Deducible Health Plans) 
 Risk Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Risk Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Risk Ratio 
(95% CI) 
Marginal Cost of Care (1) REF REF REF 
Marginal Cost of Care 
(Other) 
0.635 
(0.534 - 0.756) 
0.638 
(0.533 - 0.764) 
0.613 
(0.311  - 1.208) 
Marginal Cost of Care (0) 
0.799 
(0.702 - 0.909) 
0.825 
(0.719 - 0.948) 
0.642 
(0.454 - 0.908) 
Had an OP visit in the past 
three months  
1.303 
(1.144 - 1.484) 
1.374 
(1.195 - 1.581) 
0.912 
(0.626 - 1.327) 
Health Risk  
3.427 
(3.064 - 3.834) 
3.322 
(2.968 - 3.718) 
4.859 
(2.854 - 8.272) 
Health Risk (squared) 
0.930 
(0.918 - 0.942) 
0.933 
(0.921 - 0.945) 
0.892 
(0.832 - 0.958) 
Enrolled more than six 
months  
0.974 
(0.892 - 1.064) 
0.988 
(0.900 - 1.085) 
0.913 
(0.699 - 1.193) 
Sample Size 
 
N = 59, 583 
 
N = 52,583 
 
N = 7,000 
OP = outpatient.  
All models include individual fixed effects 
95% confidence intervals (CI) in parenthesis  
*This group represents those individuals with copayments for outpatient services – there are no copayments for any inpatient visits in this 
sample 
4
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CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECT OF NARROW NETWORK PLAN SELECTION ON UTILIZATION AND 
COST 
 
 Introduction  
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) established Marketplaces for health insurance where 
individuals could access, and choose among, health plans from a variety of insurers. In 2014, the first 
year of Marketplace operation, plans with restricted provider networks, referred to as narrow network 
plans, were popular offerings, available to 92% of the population and comprising 48% of all ACA plans 
offered in the 2014 Marketplace (Bauman, Coe, Ogden, & Parikh, 2014). Narrow networks refer to health 
plans for which an insurer contracts with a limited group of providers in a range of specialties who accept 
lower reimbursement rates as a trade-off for higher patient volume (Kliff, 2014; Summer, 2015). With 
lower reimbursement rates to providers, insurers are able to offer lower premiums to beneficiaries 
choosing narrow network plans. In addition to the lower premiums, beneficiaries in narrow network plans 
have lower out-of-pocket costs for services offered by contracted providers compared to individuals in 
broad network plans – even when they see the same provider. In return for lower costs, beneficiaries’ 
choice of providers is restricted; if beneficiaries in narrow network plans access services from providers 
not contracted to participate in the narrow network plan they could face higher out-of-pocket costs than if 
they had the same service performed by a participating provider.  
Consumer interest in lower priced products in the Marketplace drove the creation of the narrow 
network products by the insurance industry. Individuals were attracted to the lower premiums; a 2014 
survey of individuals enrolled on an ACA-compliant plan found that individuals on narrow network plans 
were more likely to report they chose one of the lowest priced products in the Marketplace (Bauman et 
al., 2014). While the lower costs enticed many individuals to sign up for narrow network plans in 2014, 
anecdotal reports and news stories indicated some individuals did not fully understand the incentives 
embedded in the structure of the narrow network plans (Polsky, 2015; Corlette, 2014). In this study we 
focus on individuals in the 2014 non-group market who had a choice to select a narrow network plan or a 
broad network plan.  Using those in broad networks as a control group, we used statistical modeling to 
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determine the effect of narrow network plans on the number of outpatient visits, percent of visits with 
providers participating in the narrow network, and out-of-pocket costs to the beneficiary.   
Background   
ACA regulations limited insurers’ traditional avenues to lower premiums by not allowing medical 
underwriting (calculating premiums based on an individual’s risk and expected costs) and by requiring 
plans to cover a more substantial minimum level services (Polsky, 2015). Through contracting, insurers 
were able negotiate lower reimbursement costs with groups of providers and pass some of those savings 
along to beneficiaries in the form of lower premiums. On average, 2014 narrow network products had 
premiums 13%-17% lower than products with similar levels of cost-sharing (Bauman et al., 2014). 
Individuals were attracted to the lower premiums; a 2014 survey of individuals enrolled on an ACA-
compliant plan found that individuals on narrow network plans were more likely to report they chose one 
of the lowest priced products in the Marketplace (Bauman et al., 2014).     
Lowering insurance costs by restricting provider choice is not a new concept in health insurance. In 
the 1990s, managed care organizations experimented with narrow network plans and found some 
evidence of cost containment (Corlette, 2014; Hancock, 2013). Unlike traditional managed care plans 
such as Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), the narrow network plans in this study do not require 
permission from a primary care provider to see a specialist; and narrow network plans do provide 
coverage for out-of-network services. Narrow network plans are often preferred provider organizations 
(PPOs), which contract with groups of providers and facilities to offer in-network services to beneficiaries 
at reduced rates (Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). PPO beneficiaries pay more for care 
delivered by out-of-network providers and facilities. Typically out-of-network care is subject to higher out-
of-network copayments, deductible limits, and coinsurance rate, and can have higher, or no, out-of-pocket 
maximum. 
Narrow network PPOs are like broad network PPOs except insurers establish in-network contracts 
with a smaller number of providers. McKinsey and Company define network size by the percent of all 
hospitals in the rating area participating in the network; networks in which 31% - 70% of hospitals 
participate are called narrow and network with participation rates of 70% or more are deemed to be broad 
(Bauman et al., 2014). Many insurers offer similar cost-sharing structures (i.e. deducible, coinsurance, 
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and copayment combinations) on narrow network and broad network PPOs with the only difference being 
network breadth (J. Gruber, & McKnight, R., 2014). In terms of quality, there were no discernible 
difference in quality metrics between hospitals included in and excluded from narrow networks nationwide 
(Bauman et al., 2014).  
 Proponents of narrow network plans have postulated that they can facilitate better coordination of care 
by ensuring that patients receive more care from providers within a certain community or hospital group, 
making it more likely that providers have working relationships and / or compatible electronic medical 
records systems (Hancock, 2013). In addition to better care coordination, narrow network beneficiaries 
should benefit from lower premiums and lower cost of services. In practice, taking advantage of cost 
reductions can be challenging. First, not all individuals in a narrow network were aware of the plan 
restrictions on providers and facilities. A 2014 survey found that 26% of individuals enrolled on an ACA-
compliant health plan were unaware of their plan’s network size (Bauman et al., 2014; Polsky, 2015). 
Second, even if beneficiaries were aware of the restricted network, they still may have had problems 
identifying participating providers and facilities.   
 Using out-of-network services can have real consequences on the price of care to the beneficiary. Out-
of-network care is subject to its own deductible, coinsurance, and copayments and, although there is 
variation in narrow network plans across the country, coinsurance, deductibles, and copayments can be 
two or three times larger for individuals seeking care out-of-network (Polsky, 2015). A national 2003 study 
found that, on average, the cost of out-of-network care was 7% higher than in-network care. The same 
study found that if high-cost PPO beneficiaries had accessed only in-network care, out-of-pocket costs 
would have been $4,000 lower on average (McDevitt, Gabel, Gandolfo, Lore, & Pickreign, 2007).  
 Insurers introduced additional narrow network plans to the market in the second year of the 
Marketplace (2015) yet few studies of the effect of restricted provider networks have been conducted in 
the non-group market (Bauman, Bello, Coe, & Lamb, 2015; J. Gruber, & McKnight, R., 2014). In this 
paper we examined the extent to which narrow networks affected the number of outpatient visits, the 
percentage of visits with providers participating in the narrow network, and total out-of-pocket costs to the 
beneficiary, for individuals who chose a narrow network plan in 2014. We used a difference-in-difference 
model to control for (1) any differences in the year prior to the introduction of narrow networks between 
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individuals enrolled in a narrow network plans in 2014 and those not on a narrow network plan, and (2) 
any other exogenous occurrences that could have affected the outcome variables over the time of the 
study.   We hypothesize that enrollment in a narrow network plan would not affect the number of 
outpatient visits but would increase the percentage of visits with providers participating in the narrow 
network and decrease total out-of-pocket costs. If this study finds individuals in narrow network plans did 
not change their behavior to visit a greater percent of participating providers, their health expenditures 
would be higher and enrollment in a narrow network plan could increase total out-of-pocket costs.  
Methods 
Data 
 The data for this study come from a large insurer in the southeastern United States. In 2014, this 
insurer was one of only two companies offering plans in the state Marketplace and in 2013, it had 86% of 
the non-group market (The Kaiser Family Foundation State Health Facts, 2013). We used 2013 and 2014 
claims data to analyze utilization by each beneficiary in our sample. Typically, insurers do not release 
contractually-negotiated reimbursement rates, but this dataset included the price of care for all services, 
including the cost of care to the beneficiary. 
Sample 
 The analytical sample included individuals who were: (1) enrolled on an ACA-compliant, non-group 
health plan for 12 months of 2014; (2) between the ages of 18 and 64 as of January 1, 2014 (working age 
adults who do not transition to Medicare); (3) in a 2014 narrow or broad network PPO plan; (4) lived in a 
county where narrow network plans were offered in the Marketplace; and (5) had 12 months of 2013 
enrollment on a plan with the same insurer.  
Outcome Variables  
We have three main outcome variables: (1) outpatient visits, (2) the percentage of visits with 
participating providers, and (3) total out-of-pocket costs. Visits were identified using 2013 and 2014 
claims and the year of the visit was assigned by the date the service began. We included both 
professional and facility claims but limited them to those where the provider designated for 
reimbursement was a physician or mid-level provider. We also excluded inpatient and emergency room 
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visits because we wanted visits to represent care which was more likely to have been planned in advance 
and for which individuals had more control over location and provider selection.  
The provider or facility eligible for reimbursement on the first line of the claim was identified as the 
provider affiliated with that claim. Narrow network affiliation was a stable trait for providers, in that 
providers were identified as “participating” based on whether or not they were contracted to participate in 
the 2014 narrow network; however the distinction was used in the pre-period as well. The outcome 
variable, visits with a participating provider as a percentage of all outpatient visits, was continuous, and 
inclusive between 0 and 100%.  
Total costs have two components: (1) all healthcare expenditures for which the beneficiary was 
responsible in each year of the study, and (2) annualized monthly premiums less any tax credits received 
(tax credits were relevant only in 2014). Costs were logged and capped at the 99
th
 percentile to minimize 
the influence of outliers (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Statistical Approach 
In 2013, this insurer did not offer narrow network plans in the non-group market. In 2014, narrow 
network plans were introduced as an option in the Marketplace, along with broad network PPOs. We take 
advantage of this quasi-experimental situation by using a series of random-effect, difference-in-difference 
models to examine the effect of narrow networks on the number of outpatient visits, percent of visits with 
participating providers, and total out-of-pocket costs for individuals who chose a narrow network plan in 
2014.  A difference-in-difference model controls for observed differences between the treatment and 
control groups as well controlling for any extemporaneous changes to the outcome variable over the time 
period.  
To ensure the control group will provide a satisfactory counterfactual, we examined pre-intervention 
trends in the outcome variables. If pre-intervention trends are not parallel than we would not have been 
able to confidently differentiate between the effect of the intervention and the natural progression of 
differences between the two groups (Ryan, Burgess, & Dimick, 2015). We examined average visits, 
percentage of visits with participating providers, and expenditures on outpatient visits in years 2011, 
2012, and 2013 and found parallel trends between the two groups (not shown). 
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𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =  𝛼 +  𝛿(𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘) +  𝜌𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  𝛾(𝑁𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) +  𝛽𝑋 +  𝜀 
The key independent variable in this model was membership in a 2014 narrow network plan in the 
non-group market. Like identification of provider participation, narrow network affiliation was a stable trait 
for beneficiaries. The label of narrow network beneficiaries defines our groups in 2013 and 2014, even 
though the plans were only available in 2014. Those in the sample who did not enroll in a 2014 narrow 
network plan were referred to as broad network beneficiaries. In the model above, α was the intercept 
representing the pre-period (2013) for broad network beneficiaries. δ was the effect of the narrow network 
in the pre-period (2013); this is also the pre-period difference between the narrow and broad network 
groups. 
This study spans two years: 2013 and 2014. In 2013 (pre-period), no members of the sample were 
enrolled in narrow network plans. In 2014 (post-period), narrow networks were introduced to the non-
group market and all individuals in the sample had the choice to enroll in one of these plans or remain in 
a broad network PPO. ρ is the effect of the post-period (2014) on the outcome for the broad network 
beneficiaries, this also represents any changes in the outcome variable over the time period that were not 
a result of the introduction of the narrow networks.  
γ, the effect of the narrow networks in the post-period, is the main effect of the model.  This is the 
effect of the narrow network plan on the outcomes for those who selected a 2014 narrow network plan, 
controlling for extemporaneous changes and observable characteristics. 
X represents other variables in the model.  Health status, represented by the risk score, is included as 
a time varying control. Risk scores have been used in previous studies to represent health status (Albert, 
2006; Thomas, 2006). We used an episode-based health risk score generated by an Ingenix Symmetry® 
algorithm accounting for age, sex, and healthcare claims from the previous 12 months (Symmetry® 
Episode Treatment Groups®, 2012). Our model utilized the prospective risk score, which combines 
demographics and claims data from the past 12 months to calculate a risk score that predicts the risk of 
an individual being high cost in the subsequent year (Symmetry® Episode Treatment Groups®, 2012).  
Two risk scores were generated for each individual in the sample – one created on January 31, 2013 to 
predict risk of high health expenditures in 2013 and the other created on January 31, 2014 for 2014 risk.  
In the pre-period the risk variable is the risk from 2013 and in the post-period it is the risk variable from 
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2014. When the outcome was the percentage of visits with a participating provider we also controlled for 
the number of visits in each year.   
We ran fixed effect and random effects models and compared the coefficients on our main variables. 
We found no difference in the estimates and, since fixed effects methods are less efficient and, in this 
case, random effects methods were unbiased, we used random effects in our difference-in-difference 
models. Because we are using a random effects model we are able include additional time invariant 
controls. In these models we control for age, gender, and presence of chronic conditions (asthma/ COPD, 
health failure, hypertension, or diabetes). We also controlled for ACA specific factors such as an indicator 
for each rating regions in this state and any applied premium tax credits (APTCs) received by the 
beneficiary. Standard errors in the difference-in-difference models were obtained by bootstrapping over 
1,000 replications (Ryan et al., 2015). All analyses were done in SAS (SAS Institute, 2011).  
Results    
 The analytical sample contained 12,332 individuals, 37.5% of whom were in a narrow network health 
plan in 2014 (Table 10).  There was no statistically significant difference between the mean age of the 
treatment and control groups (mean age 45) but females were less likely to choose a narrow network plan  
(55.6% vs. 59.1 %, P<0.0001). Individuals on narrow network plans were at a lower risk of having high 
healthcare expenditures (P<0.0001). Only 27.8% of individuals who enrolled on a narrow network plan 
had at least one of the following conditions: asthma/ COPD, diabetes, heart failure, and / or hypertension, 
while slightly more (29.9%) individuals on a broad network plan had one of such conditions (P=0.012). 
Individuals who joined narrow network plans had lower 2013 monthly premiums ($282 vs. $387, 
P<0.0001) and higher applied premium tax credits in 2014 ($261 vs. $203, P<0.0001) (Table 10).  
Unadjusted Results  
 In Table 11, we present the unadjusted means for our three main outcome variables: (1) outpatient 
visits, (2) the percentage of visits with participating providers, and (3) total out-of-pocket costs.  We 
calculated 95% confidence intervals (CI) around the means and we present the percentage change 
between years and groups.  
Individuals both in narrow and broad networks saw increases in the mean number of visits with 
physicians or mid-level providers in between 2013 and 2014 (7% and 9% respectively) (Table 11). In both 
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2013 and 2014 mean number of visits for the narrow network group was 25%-27% lower than for the 
broad network group (Table 11). 
In the pre-period, individuals in the narrow network group had a higher percentage of their 
outpatient visits with providers who participated in the narrow network compared to individuals not in the 
narrow network (2013 mean for individuals in narrow networks: 48.9% CI: 47.7%-50.1% vs. 2013 mean 
for individuals in broad networks: 44.2% CI: 43.3%-45.1%) (Table 11). While individuals in broad network 
plans had no significant change in the mean percentage of visits with participating providers, individuals 
in narrow networks had a 16% (unadjusted) increase in the percentage of visits with participating 
providers between 2013 to 2014 (Table 11).  
The unadjusted results show that individuals in narrow network plans had lower mean total costs 
in both the pre-period (24.6% lower) and the post-period (28.9% lower). While total costs decreased 
between 2013 and 2014 for both groups, the mean unadjusted total cost for individuals in narrow network 
plans decreased more than for individuals in broad network plans (24.5% vs. 20.0%) (Table 11). 
Compared to premiums for broad network beneficiaries, premiums (which account for 77% of total costs) 
were 31% lower for individuals who selected a 2014 narrow network plan (they were 25.9% lower in 
2013). Relative to 2013 premiums, individuals who selected a 2014 narrow network plan had a larger 
decrease in their 2014 premiums (25.3% vs. 19.8%) (Table 11). The difference in 2014 premiums was 
likely due to uneven receipt of APTCs between the narrow and broad network groups. Individuals in 
narrow network plans were more likely to have received an APTC, which were available to qualifying 
individuals in ACA-compliant plans only in 2014, than individuals on broad network plans (58% vs. 41%) 
(Table 10). 
Difference-in-Difference Results  
In Table 12 we present difference-in-difference model results with 95% CIs. Although the mean 
number of visits for individuals on narrow network plans was significantly higher in 2014 compared to 
2013, controlling for pre-period differences and adjusting for risk and other variables make the effect of 
enrolling on a narrow network plan on outpatient visits statistically insignificant (Table 12). Controlling for 
observable characteristics and any extemporaneous changes, individuals who self-selected narrow 
network plans had an increase in the percent of outpatient visits with participating providers of 9.40 
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percentage points (CI: 7.24-11.55) and a decrease in total costs of 32.89% (CI: -41.36%- -24.41% ) 
(Table 12). 
Discussion  
 Narrow network plans were pervasive and popular choices for consumers in the first year of the 
health insurance Marketplaces. Although nationally there was much heterogeneity in the creation and 
execution of narrow network plans, the underlying concept was for insurers to offer a lower premium to 
individuals and, in return, beneficiaries were incentivized to visit a particular set of contracted providers, 
or face a penalty through a higher cost of services. To-date, very few studies have been conducted on the 
effect of narrow network plans on costs and utilization in the non-group market (J. Gruber, & McKnight, 
R., 2014). The results from our study support the idea that individuals who select narrow network plans 
can save money overall without reducing the number of outpatient visits. Moreover, consistent with 
incentives, these beneficiaries increased the percentage of visits with providers participating in the narrow 
network.  
 Reports of narrow networks stated that individuals chose narrow network plans because of the lower 
costs, specifically the plan premiums (Kliff, 2014; Summer, 2015). Our results provide direct empirical 
support for this finding. We found that the 2013 unadjusted, average monthly premium for the narrow 
network group was 21.9% lower than the average for the broad network group.  2013 premiums were 
medically underwritten, which means that lower premiums may have been a function of a healthier 
population. However, a higher percentage of individuals in narrow networks had deductibles over $5,000 
in 2013 (34.3% v. 26.6%). Individuals with higher deductibles would have had lower premiums as well 
providing evidence that individuals who selected 2014 narrow network plans had a preference for lower 
premiums over higher cost-sharing.   
 In the unadjusted results, individuals who selected narrow network plans were more likely to have 
been visiting participating providers in the pre-period. Compared to individuals who did not switch 
networks, individuals who joined narrow network plans in 2014 were more likely to see participating 
providers (48.9% vs. 44.2%). This is consistent with plan incentives which are, not to decrease utilization, 
but to steer individuals to participating, and therefore lower cost, providers. Individuals who chose to join 
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a narrow network in 2014 who were already seeing a participating provider would not have had a 
disruption to continuity of care.  
 We found support that the narrow networks do not decrease overall utilization. Individuals in the 
narrow network group had fewer outpatient visits in both 2013 and 2014, although care rose slightly for 
both groups in 2014. This is notable for two reasons: (1) individuals in the narrow networks were not 
deterred from accessing care; and (2) the observed decrease in out-of-pocket costs did not result from 
less outpatient care, but rather of a combination of lower premiums and lower cost of care.   
 We found evidence that narrow network enrollment was associated with an increased percentage of 
visits with participating providers. Narrow network plan beneficiaries were more likely to increase the 
percentage of visits they had with participating providers after joining the narrow network plan. These 
results suggest that, at least for individuals renewing health plans, beneficiaries were able to understand 
and follow the incentives of the narrow network plan to steer them to participating providers.  
 Individuals who selected a narrow network plan were generally at lower risk of being high cost 
compared to individuals on a broad network plan (risk scores for individuals on narrow network plans 
were 20% lower than risk scores for individuals on broad network plans), which could have implications 
for the percentage of visits an individual has with participating providers. Individuals who are less healthy 
or use more care may have established relationships with providers and those existing relationships 
might be difficult to break. Additionally, less healthy individuals may have more need for certain 
specialists and, although the networks should have a full range of providers in terms of number and type, 
individuals with special needs may have preferences that draw them out-of-network (Corlette, 2014).  
Beneficiaries in broad network plans had only a very slight decrease in the unadjusted 
percentage of visits they had with participating providers. Since the overall number of outpatient provider 
visits increased in 2014, we can surmise that participating providers were seeing more patients because 
of the narrow networks. This is supported by evidence in other studies that found cost-sharing swayed 
visits to new providers but did not have an effect on existing provider relationships (Sinaiko & Rosenthal, 
2014). Whether or not this increase in patients is enough to cover the decrease in the amount of 
reimbursement is outside the scope of this paper. 
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 Results show that for this sample, enrollment in a 2014 narrow network plan was associated with a 
decrease in total out-of-pocket costs to the beneficiary. A large percentage of total costs (77%) were 
lower premiums associated with narrow network plans (premiums adjusted for APTCs), and the reminder 
of out-of-pocket costs were healthcare expenditures. Expenditures decreased between 2013 and 2014 for 
both narrow and broad network beneficiaries, but the decreases was 2 percentage points greater for 
narrow network beneficiaries, partially due to the lower cost of services resulting from the increase the 
percentage of visits with participating providers.  
Limitations 
 There were several limitations to this study. Our study was conducted with one insurer, which limits 
generalizability. This is important because of the wide heterogeneity in narrow network plans nationally 
and the variation in implementation by state and by insurer (Schultz, 2014); (Giovannelli, 2015). However, 
the insurer in this study had a significantly large market share of the state’s non-group health insurance 
beneficiaries, which makes this study generalizable within the state (The Kaiser Family Foundation State 
Health Facts, 2013). Second, we focus only on outpatient provider-based visits because they are more 
actionable, in that people have more ability to make decisions about where to go. Thus, we do not know 
the effect of narrow networks on unplanned emergency room and inpatient visits. Third, the sample for 
this study was composed of individuals who were continuously enrolled with this same insurer in 2013 
and 2014. Due to the inclusion criteria of 12 months of 2013 enrollment, the average income level of the 
sample was higher than the average income of the total population of individuals enrolled on ACA-
compliant plans in 2014. The higher income is evidenced by the lower percentage of individuals in our 
sample with an APTC (41.2%-58.3%) compared to the national average (86%) (Table 10) (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2014). The results of this study may not apply to 
individuals who were new to health insurance in 2014 or to all low-income individuals.  
 Finally, our model may exhibit heterogeneous treatment effects. Individuals who self-select into a 
narrow network plan may differ from individuals who do not in unmeasured ways (e.g., they may be less 
prepared for, or aware of, narrow network plan guidelines) and as such they might not respond to plan 
incentives in the same way as those who purposively selected a narrow network plan. In 2014, enrollees 
in this study could choose to enroll in a narrow or broader network plan; all plans were self-selected and 
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not assigned. These findings could be different if individuals were forced into narrow network plans, for 
example if, in the future, health plans limit the availability of broader network plans.   
Conclusions   
 Heath insurance premiums and healthcare expenditures are projected to rise and health plans with 
narrow networks are one mechanism insurers are using to control costs (CBO, 2015). Narrow network 
plans offer individuals lower premiums and, in return, individuals are encouraged through cost-sharing to 
visit certain providers and facilities. Narrow network implementation was heterogeneous throughout the 
country with varied levels of success but the rising popularity of these products suggests more health 
plans may be trending towards restricted provider networks.   
 In this study, we found individuals who self-selected to enroll in a narrow network health plan had no 
effective change in the number of outpatient visits but higher proportion of their visits with participating 
providers. Utilizing in-network care is imperative for lowering out-of-pocket costs on a PPO. Individuals on 
narrow network plans under this particular insurer were able to adhere to plan incentives and therefore 
were able to enjoy lower total out-of-pocket costs compared to individuals who did not choose 2014 
narrow network plans.  
 This study shows an example of one insurer under which the narrow network plans succeeded in 
lowering costs and steering individuals towards participating providers. It appears that individuals on 
narrow network plans responded to incentives on where to seek care. To ensure individuals in narrow 
network plans continue to comply with plan incentives and visit participating provider, more transparency 
may be needed on provider and facility participation in narrow networks (Corlette, 2014).  
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Tables 
Table 10: Aim 3 Summary Statistics 
Mean (unless indicated otherwise) Narrow Network Broad Network 
   
N (12,332) 4,621 (37.5%) 7,711 (62.5%) 
Female 55.6% 59.1%*** 
Age 45.4 45.3 
On a family policy 71.3% 75.3%*** 
Health Status   
Presence Any Chronic Condition 27.8% 29.9%* 
Health Risk Score (2013) 1.275 1.573 *** 
Health Risk Score (2014) 1.366 1.687 *** 
2013 Plan Information   
Low 2013 Deductible (below $3,000) 43.3% 31.7%*** 
Medium 2013 Deductible (between $3,000 - 
$5,000) 
30.1% 34.0%*** 
High 2013 Deducible ($5,000 and higher) 26.6% 34.3%*** 
2013 Monthly Premium $ 281.52 $ 386.94 *** 
2014 Tax Credits   
Percent with applied premium tax credit 58.3% 41.2%*** 
Amount of applied premium tax credit (monthly) $ 261.21 $ 203.39 *** 
   
*, **, *** significantly difference from narrow network at p<0.01, p<0.001, and p<0.0001 
respectively  
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Table 11: Unadjusted Means (with 95% Confidence Intervals (CI)) and Percentage Change for Three 
Outcomes by Network and Year 
 
 
2013 Mean ( 95% CI) 2014 Mean ( 95% CI) 
Percentage change 
from 2013 to 2014 
Mean Visits 
Broad Network 
7.28 
(7.10- 7.46) 
7.95 
(7.76-8.13) 
9.2% 
Narrow Network 
5.43 
(5.25- 5.61) 
5.80 
(5.60- 5.99) 6.7% 
  Percent difference between 
narrow and broad networks 
-25.4% -27.0%  
 
 
Percent of Visits with Participating  Providers 
Broad Network 
44.2% 
(43.3%- 45.1%) 
43.0% 
(42.1%- 43.9%) 
-2.8% 
Narrow Network 
48.9% 
(47.7%- 50.1%) 
56.7% 
(55.5%- 57.9%) 16.0% 
   Percent difference between 
narrow and broad networks 
10.6% 32.0%  
 
 
Mean Total Costs to Beneficiary 
Broad Network 
$ 5,886 
($ 5,792 -$ 5,980) 
$ 4,704 
($  4,628 - $  4,781) 
-20.0% 
Narrow Network 
$ 4,432 
($ 4,338 -$ 4,526) 
$ 3,343 
($ 3,259 - $ 3,427) 
-24.5% 
Percent difference between 
narrow and broad networks 
-24.6% -28.9%  
 
 
Mean Adjusted Premiums (77% of 2014 Total Costs) 
Broad Network 
$ 4,514 
($ 4,437 -$ 4,591) 
$ 3,621 
($  3,559 - $  3,683) 
-19.8% 
 
Narrow Network 
$ 3,346 
($ 3,275 -$ 3,417) 
$ 2,498 
($ 2,431 - $ 2,566) 
-25.3% 
 
 
 
Percent difference between 
narrow and broad networks 
-25.9% -31.0%  
 
 
Mean Healthcare Expenditures (23% of 2014 Total Costs) 
Broad Network 
$ 1,327 
($ 1,285 -$ 1,368) 
$ 1,071 
($  1,036 - $  1,105) 
-19.3% 
Narrow Network 
$ 1,054 
($ 1,005 -$ 1,103) 
$ 828 
($ 789 - $ 868) 
-21.4% 
Percent difference between 
narrow and broad networks 
-20.6% -22.6%  
 
  
 
 
Table 12: Difference-in-Difference Model Results: Estimates and 95% Confidences Intervals (CI) for Three Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
Pre-period 
Non- Narrow Network 
Pre-period 
Narrow Network 
Post-period 
Non- Narrow Network 
Post-period 
Narrow Network 
Outpatient Visits  REF 
-0.20 
(-0.24 -  -0.16) 
0.08 
(0.02  - 0.14) 
-0.03 
( -0.09 - 0.03) 
     
Percent of Visits with Participating 
Providers  (Percentage point change) 
REF 
5.42 
(3.90 - 6.94) 
-1.95 
(-3.50 -  -0.39 ) 
9.40 
(7.24 – 11.55) 
     
Total Out-of-Pocket Costs  
(Percent change) 
REF 
-2.33% 
(-7.55% - 2.90%) 
-50.65% 
(-58.70% -  -42.59%) 
-32.89% 
(-41.36% - -24.41%) 
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 
Conclusions 
 Historically, the majority of studies on health insurance plan selection and the effect of insurance on 
healthcare utilization have been conducted in the public or employer-sponsored insurance markets, with 
few studies being conducted in the non-group market (Nadash & Day, 2014; M. V. Pauly & Nichols, 2002; 
Sommers, 2014). However, the non-group health insurance market operates differently than the market 
for public insurance or employer-sponsored insurance, offering individuals more choices of plans and 
requiring consumers to compare multiple plan options (Jost, 2014). Enactment of the ACA and the 
creation of the Marketplaces expanded the non-group health insurance market over 200% between 2013 
and 2015 (Carman et al., 2015a). To ensure that consumers in this new and expanding market are able 
to make informed decisions when choosing a health insurance plan and using that plan to access 
healthcare services, policymakers and industry leaders need to understand the behavior of non-group 
health insurance beneficiaries. This dissertation focused specifically on plan selection, and the effect of 
plan selection on healthcare utilization, for individuals in the non-group health insurance market in the first 
year of ACA Marketplace operation.  
 Using data from a single insurer, I conducted analyses on the first year of Marketplace operation in a 
Federally-Facilitated Marketplace (a Marketplace in a state that opted to allow the Federal Government to 
manage Marketplace operations). This dissertation examined the range of health insurance related 
decisions that beneficiaries made, from choosing a plan to using that plan to access healthcare services. I 
focused on individuals who were not new to health insurance in 2014, but had the decision whether to 
enroll in a QHP through the ACA-established Marketplace or to re-enroll on a Grandfathered / Transitional 
plan. In separate analyses, I analyzed the effect of two aspects of health plans, network breadth and cost-
sharing, on the utilization of healthcare services.  
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Summary of Findings   
 In analyzing plan selection and utilization I uncovered some common themes, namely the pervasive 
effects of health status and cost.  First, I found evidence that less healthy individuals chose more 
generous plans; however, for some individuals, the cost of the monthly premium was the main 
determinant of plan selection. Plan generosity and premium price influenced the plan’s cost-sharing 
structure, and I found evidence that cost-sharing impacted the number of outpatient visits and the choice 
of providers. Lastly, cost-sharing was not the only factor driving utilization; in addition to the effect of 
health status on plan selection, I found that less healthy individuals used exponentially more of all types 
of services (more outpatient, emergency room, and inpatient visits).   
Plan Selection: The Influence of Health Status   
 In this dissertation, I found individuals who were at high-risk for high healthcare expenditures were 
more likely to enroll in a plan with greater actuarial value (aim 1) and less likely to enroll in a plan with a 
restricted provider network (aim 3). In aim 1, I examined characteristics associated with switching from a 
Grandfathered or Transitional plan to a QHP and, conditional on switching, the characteristics associated 
with selecting a metal level. I found that individuals at high-risk for high healthcare expenditures who had 
APTCs had lower odds of choosing a less generous plan compared to high-risk individuals without 
APTCs (odds of selecting a bronze plan over a sliver plan: 0.40, CI: 0.30- 0.55) but found the opposite to 
be true for low-risk individuals with APTCs (odds of selecting a bronze plan over a silver plan compared to 
low-risk individuals without APTCs 1.35, CI: 1.09- 1.66). APTCs are available to low income individuals 
and can be applied to any metal level; the fact that high-risk individuals had lower odds of selecting a less 
generous plan with their APTCs demonstrates that they value more generous health insurance, 
prioritizing health insurance within limited budgets. These findings support the necessity of the APTCs in 
providing access to more generous health plans for low-income, high-risk individuals.  
 Choosing between plans with different breadths of provider networks is different than choosing 
between plans with different actuarial values; many narrow network plans have the same actuarial value 
as their broad network PPO counterparts. Although actuarial value could be the same, narrow network 
plans restrict the choice of provider which could disrupt continuity of care. In aim 3, we found that high-
risk individuals, who are more likely to be obtaining care, were less likely to select a narrow network plan. 
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Plan Selection: The Influence of Premiums 
 Comparing unadjusted average premiums for individuals who chose to enroll in a narrow network 
QHP and those who also switched to a 2014 QHP but enrolled in a broad network PPO, I found those 
who selected a narrow network plan in 2014 had lower premiums in 2013. In 2013 the unadjusted, 
average monthly premium for individuals who were to self-select a narrow network plan in 2014 was 
21.9% lower than those who joined a broad network PPO. Also, a higher percentage of individuals in 
2014 narrow network plans had 2013 deductibles over $5,000 (34.3% v. 26.6%, P<0.0001) which also 
demonstrates their preference for lower premiums over other plan characteristics. 
 Aim 1 also provided evidence of the importance of lower premiums for some individuals. Individuals 
who had APTCs and were at low-risk of being high cost were more likely to select a plan with a lower 
premium (odds of selecting a bronze plan over a silver plan 1.35, CI: 1.09- 1.66). This finding suggests 
low-risk individuals were more likely to apply tax credits towards the purchase of less generous plans and 
save money on health insurance and thereby increasing their budget for other goods.  
 Overall, I found that some individuals value lower premiums over more generous plans and more 
provider options. Health insurance, even less generous health plans, provides a backstop against the 
potential of financial catastrophe resulting from a medical emergency. For some individuals who 
anticipate using fewer healthcare services, choosing less generous plans can be a reasonable option. 
Aim 2 shows that individuals who choose HDHPs, with lower premiums and higher cost-sharing, use less 
care overall. If using less care does not impact long term health (i.e., avoiding needed care) than low 
premium, high cost-sharing plans could be rational choices for individuals who do not prioritize health 
insurance.  
Healthcare Utilization: The Influence of Cost-Sharing and Provider Networks 
 In aim 2, I used 2014 claims to assess the effect of intra-year variation in the marginal cost of care 
on outpatient and inpatient utilization by individuals in the non-group health insurance market. I 
concentrated on services for ACSCs, for which inpatient visits should be avoidable with access to quality 
and timely outpatient care. After controlling for health status and length of enrollment, I found that a 
decrease in the marginal cost of care was associated with an increased likelihood of an outpatient visit 
(RR = 1.104, CI: 1.088-1.119), but not emergency room visits (RR=1.080, CI: 0.990-1.178) or inpatient 
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admissions (RR=0.799, CI: 0.702-0.909). These findings support previous studies of cost-sharing on 
utilization, such as the RAND HIE which found a decrease in cost-sharing to be associated with increased 
outpatient utilization (Manning et al., 1987).  
 Individuals who self-selected HDHPs and therefore were responsible for 100% of costs until they 
reached the deductible (HDHPs provided no copayments for services) were less likely to have any 
healthcare visits regardless of the marginal cost of care compared to individuals who were only 
responsible for a copayment. However, when the marginal cost of accessing another unit of care was 0, 
individuals on HDHPs had a greater likelihood of using outpatient services (RR=1.265, CI: 1.204 - 1.328).  
 We found that although narrow networks did not change utilization of outpatient services in terms of 
quantity, they did have an effect on behavior with regards to provider selection. Individuals in narrow 
network plans who saw participating providers incurred lower costs than: (1) individuals in broad network 
plans who saw the same providers;  and (2) lower costs than if they had the same services with non-
participating providers. In aim 3 I examined the effect of narrow networks on outpatient visits, percent of 
visits with providers participating in the narrow network, and out-of-pocket costs to the beneficiary for 
individuals continuously enrolled in 2013 and 2014. Enrollment in the narrow network plan increased the 
percentage of visits individuals had with participating providers and, because individuals were able to 
adhere to provider steerage incentives, narrow network plan enrollment was associated with a decrease 
(32.89%) in total out-of-pocket costs to the beneficiary (however, a large portion of the savings was due 
to lower premiums associated with narrow network plans).  
 Findings from this dissertation suggest that selection of a healthcare plan can have real effects on 
utilization of care. As mentioned above, high-risk individuals tend to choose more generous plans, which 
is an encouraging sign for market operations. Since cost-sharing does impact utilization it is important 
that individuals who need more care enroll on more generous plans with lower cost-sharing.  The 
Marketplace provides lots of plan options and, while over-insuring would also be a suboptimal outcome, it 
is important than individuals who anticipate high utilization are not putting too much weight on premiums 
and under-insuring on plans with low actuarial value.  
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Healthcare Utilization: The Influence of Health Status  
 In aim 2, we found an association between health status and utilization. Health status was 
operationalized as the risk that an individual will be less or more costly than the rest of the sample due to 
being more or less healthy (Symmetry® Episode Treatment Groups®, 2012). As health risk increases 
(indicating a decrease in health status), we see the relative risk of outpatient, emergency room, and 
inpatient services increase exponentially (Figure 3).  Less healthy individuals have higher likelihood of 
accessing care, controlling for marginal cost of care. These results suggest that less healthy individuals 
are more likely to access care than healthier individuals; this is an indication that cost-sharing incentives 
are working as designed by neither preventing people from getting care they need nor incentivizing 
healthy individuals to get care they do not need.   
Figure 2: Relative Risk of Utilization by Health Risk and Type of Visit 
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Policy Implications 
 The first year of the ACA provided a quasi-experimental situation which we were able to use to our 
advantage. ACA-compliant QHPs, with community rated premiums, minimum benefit requirements, and 
the option for restricted network plans, were introduced to the non-group market for the first time and 
individuals in this market had the option to switch to one of these QHPs or remain on their Grandfathered 
or Transitional plan. This dissertation adds an important contribution to the literature through the analysis 
of claims data from a large insurer with regards to the first year of operation in the Marketplace. This 
unique dataset, which included all services, costs, and plan benefits for beneficiaries in the non-group 
market, allowed me to conduct a thorough analysis of the response of beneficiaries to costs and benefits 
of health insurance. The results of these timely studies of an actively changing program have implications 
for future policies; this dissertation provides evidence of the importance of the APTCs in providing access 
to affordable insurance plans and the necessity of ensuring individuals have a solid understanding of the 
complicated details of health insurance benefits when selecting a plan.  
The Importance of APTCs  
 This study provided support for the importance of the APTCs in ensuring access to affordable 
healthcare for consumers in the Marketplaces and provides positive indications of tax credit application. 
Through the APTCs, low-income individuals who anticipate high healthcare expenditures were able to 
purchase health plans with relatively high actuarial values. And, while APTCs were necessary for allowing 
individuals who need more generous health plans to purchase those plans, they did not encourage 
healthier individuals to over-insure.  Although APTCs are important, their generosity might not go far 
enough; individuals with APTCs who were at high-risk for high healthcare expenditures had higher odds 
of selecting silver plans over bronze plans, but lower odds of selecting gold or platinum plans over silver 
plans compared to other high-risk but wealthier beneficiaries.  
Understanding QHPs  
 The ACA required QHPs to set premiums using modified community ratings and to adhere to 
minimum benefit standards. I found evidence that individuals most likely to benefit from these 
requirements were more likely to have switched to a QHP in 2014. This suggests that, even in the first 
year of operation, individuals understood what made QHPs an attractive option over Grandfathered and 
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Transitional plans. The first year of the Marketplace was fraught with additional hardships from website 
failures, court challenges, negative press, and conflicting or inaccurate information, however, open 
enrollment in 2015 was smoother than 2014 and mistakes of the first year have been studied and 
absorbed, providing reason to think that the process will only improve in the future (Office of the Inspector 
General, 2014) (Grob, 2014).   
Understanding Health Benefits 
 The non-group market requires individuals to self-select health plans from a large set of options. In 
this dissertation, I found evidence that individuals who selected a HDHP had a lower risk of an outpatient 
visit, emergency room visit, or an inpatient admission and used less care in 2014 and that individuals who 
selected a narrow network plan increased the percentage of visits with participating providers. These 
examples provide evidence that individuals understood the incentives of the plan structures they selected. 
While purposeful self-selection of health plans in year one is a positive sign for Marketplace operations, 
this study focused mainly on individuals who were enrolled in health plans in 2013, future policies need to 
ensure that individuals who are new to the market are also able to make informed decisions about plan 
selection. Additionally, as premiums continue to rise, policymakers need to revisit the question of 
purposeful selection to ensure that individuals continue to select plans based on a range of criteria and 
not just price (CBO, 2015). 
Limitations 
 This study has several limitations. First of all, generalizability is limited because I used data from only 
one insurer. At the time of this study, this particular state was fairly unique in its lack of competition and 
dominance from one insurer. Although this particular insurer represented a large percentage of the non-
group market in the state, every state had different experiences with implementation of the ACA and the 
execution of the Marketplaces. Also, the focus of this study (aims 1 and 3) was on individuals who were 
enrolled in health insurance plans in 2013 as well as 2014. Individuals on 2014 QHPs who had insurance 
prior to implementation of the ACA and the establishment of the Marketplaces were generally higher 
income and lower health risk than individuals who were new to health insurance in 2014.  Both income 
and health risk have effects on outcome variables suggesting that results from this study might not hold 
for individuals new to insurance in 2014.  
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 Secondly, each aim would have benefited had I controlled for income, however no accurate variable 
for income was available. Income plays a large role in which health insurance plans individuals choose 
and how they utilize healthcare. Health insurance is not the only good individuals purchase and as such 
premium payments are a trade-off for other goods and services. Also, health insurance is not the only 
cost involved in accessing care; healthcare services cost money even with health insurance and as such 
income also plays a role in how individuals with insurance access care.  
 Aim 3 results only apply to individuals who self-selected into a narrow network plan and the results 
may not be transferable to individuals who were forced into a narrow network plan, as is sometimes the 
case in the employer-sponsored health insurance market. However, in 2014 everyone in this sample was 
given the choice to enroll in a narrow or broad network plan.  These findings could be different if 
individuals were forced into narrow network plans, for example if, in the future, health plans limit the 
availability of broader network plans.    
 Additionally, this study was conducted only on data from one year of Marketplace operation. Data 
from previous years of enrollment was used as a control but the focus was on experiences in the first year 
of the Marketplace. Studies of the first year of implementation of the major ACA provisions affecting the 
non-group market (guaranteed issue, the individual mandate, and the Marketplaces) are important 
because they provide early results from which policymakers and industry leaders can examine policy 
impacts and make adjustments to ensure the market is operating as desired. However, year one of 
Marketplace operations may not be indicative of future years as individuals, industry leaders, and 
policymakers learn more about the market and the market adapts to policy changes.  
Future Directions 
 This dissertation used secondary data to provide a comprehensive snapshot of decision making 
regarding selection of health plans and utilization of insurance in the first year of the non-group health 
insurance Marketplace. The work conducted in this dissertation provided a foundation for future 
longitudinal studies and research involving primary data collection.    
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Longitudinal Studies  
Individuals who are new to health insurance 
 Previously uninsured individuals who signed up in 2014 after having been closed out of the non-
group market had higher utilization in the first few months of Marketplace operations, some of that might 
have been pent-up demand but it also could be a difference in proclivities towards healthcare utilization 
(Owen, 2015). Future studies should examine whether these higher rates of utilization retreat to the rate 
of the underlying population or whether individuals who were new to insurance in 2014 continue to 
behave differently than other health insurance beneficiaries.   
More follow up / longer time periods 
 A full analysis of this population and the effect of QHP selection on health outcomes will require long-
term studies. Future studies should examine the cumulative effect of years of enrollment in HDHPs, 
narrow network plans, and bronze metal level plans on health outcomes, especially for individuals with 
chronic conditions.   
Primary Data Collection  
Focus groups and surveys 
 Because individuals in the non-group market self-select health plans, it is important to know how 
much they understood about their choices and the extent to which their decision making was purposeful. 
Focus groups and surveys could be conducted to elicit opinions on market operations and the content, 
level and format of guidance that would be useful in informing future decisions.   
Conjoint Analysis 
 Some individuals chose plans with low premiums because they expected to use less care; other 
individuals might have actually valued more generous plans and expected to use healthcare services but 
myopic preference led them to select a plan with a lower premium. Conjoint analysis and discrete choice 
models can be used to tease apart the health insurance attributes most important to individuals and help 
guide them to the plan that truly best fits their particular preferences.   
Selection Tool  
 A useful future project would be the creation of a health plan selection tool that would incorporate 
past utilization, expected healthcare needs, risk tolerance, budgetary limitations, and provider 
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preferences in a way that would aid in consumer decision making. A benefit of this tool would be to help 
individuals better understand the trade-offs between lower premiums, cost-sharing, restricted provider 
networks, and plan generosity.   
Conclusion  
 Unlike the public or employer-sponsored health insurance markets, in the non-group market 
individuals are offered a myriad of health plan options and must choose a plan in which to enroll. The 
ability to self-select a specific plan can be beneficial as long as individuals are knowledgeable about their 
choices and purposeful in their selection. Overall, the healthcare industry is experiencing a shift to a more 
consumer driven market. Through consumer driven health plans, increases in transparency and price 
tools, and the shift away from paternalistic care, individuals are becoming more engaged in all aspects of 
the healthcare system. The ACA Marketplaces increased the consumer-focused nature of the health 
insurance market through the individual mandate, minimum benefit requirements, and uniformity of metal 
levels. 
 The ACA has changed the non-group health insurance market. Although the majority of Americans 
still purchase health insurance through their employer, the non-group market for health insurance has 
been expanding while the percentage of individuals with employer-sponsored insurance has been in 
decline over the past decade (Blavin, Holahan, Kenney, & Chen, 2012; Carman, Eibner, & Paddock, 
2015b; Gould, 2009). The mandate that US citizens have adequate health insurance coverage requires a 
functional and robust Marketplace. Industry leaders and policymakers need to understand behavior in this 
new Marketplace in order to both provide individuals with appropriate and useful information to aid in plan 
selection and to understand how future policy changes will affect behavior in this market. As ACA 
regulations and Marketplaces become more engrained in the health insurance system, we may see a 
wider expansion of the non-group market, or at least an expansion of the consumer driven aspects of this 
market. The ACA has fundamentally changed the health insurance industry, while exact details of how 
the system will look in the future are not certain, early analyses of ACA implementation can help industry 
leaders, policymakers, and consumer better navigate the market. 
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APPENDIX 1: SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR AIM 2 
Dichotomized Risk  
 I tested model formation by operationalizing the risk score in different ways.  One version of the 
model utilized two indicator variables for risk score: one to indicate a likelihood of high healthcare costs 
(top 75
th
 percentile) and another to indicate a likelihood of lower healthcare costs (lower 25
th
 percentile).  
These variables were created for ease of interpretation and to clearly capture the non-linear relationship 
between health and utilization. Another way to model non-linearity in an explanatory variable is with a 
quadratic (or squared) term. I compared the quasilikelihood under the independence model information 
criterion (QIC) from the model run with the two indicator variables to the QIC for the model with a 
continuous and quadratic term for health risk. The QIC, similar to Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) is 
measure of goodness of fit for non-nested maximum likelihood estimation model. The AIC is a function of 
the number of parameters in the model and the log likelihood and the QIC is similar to the AIC except that 
quasilikelihood instead of the log likelihood to better represent generalized estimation models (Hardin & 
Hilbe, 2003).  With both the QIC and the AIC, the smallest value indicates the model with the best fit. QIC 
values for the model as run with continuous and quadratic risk versus the model with categorical risk are 
shown below for all three outcome measures (outpatient, emergency room visits, and inpatient 
admission) (Appendix 2 Table 1).   
 In addition to QIC, theory supports representing risk score as a continuous and quadratic term as we 
would expect the probability of higher utilization to increase exponentially with increased risk. The 
estimates on the continuous risk variables are positive and between 0 and 1 and the estimates on the 
quadratic terms are negative and between 0.001 and 0.1 - creating a graph that is concave upward with a 
positive slope.  
 Changing the formation of the risk score in the model altered the effect of some of the other variables 
in the model, with the largest effects on the risk ratios in the model where inpatient admission is the 
outcome variable (Appendix 2 Table 2). There was no statistically significant difference in the estimates in 
the model when outpatient visits is the outcome variable.  For the models of emergency room (ER) visits, 
the effect of a marginal cost of care (MCC) of 0 is statistically significant different when the risk score is 
represented as a continuous / quadratic variable rather than a categorical variable. When the risk score 
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was operationalized as two categorical variables, having a marginal cost of zero was statistically 
significantly associated with an increase in ER visits;  when the risk score was continuous the effect of a 
marginal cost of zero on ER visits was not significant (RR = 1.24, CI 1.15-1.35 versus RR = 1.08, CI: 
0.99-1.18).  Changing the health risk variable from two indicators to a continuous and quadratic variable 
had the largest impact on the risk ratios when the outcome was inpatient visits. When the risk score was 
operationalized as two categorical variables, having a marginal cost of zero was statistically significantly 
associated with an increase in impatient admissions; when the risk score was continuous and quadratic 
the effect of a marginal cost of zero was not a statistically significant (RR = 1.24, CI 1.15-1.35 versus RR 
= 1.08, CI: 0.99-1.18). When the risk score was operationalized as two categorical variables, having a 
had an outpatient visits in the past three months was not statistically significantly but when the risk score 
was continuous and quadratic having a had an outpatient visits in the past three months was statistically 
significantly associated with an increase in impatient admissions (RR = 0.93, CI 0.82-1.06 versus RR = 
1.30, CI 1.114-1.48).  The variable transformation likely has such a significant effect when the outcome 
was inpatient admissions because of the because of the strong association between health risk and 
inpatient visits.  
Individuals Who Met Their Deductible / Out-of-Pocket Maximum  
 Over 50% of individuals in the sample were enrolled for twelve months of 2014 and 80% were 
enrolled for nine or more months. Only 23% of individuals in the sample reached their deductible limit and 
even fewer (16%) reached their annual spending maximum over the course of 2014. Five percent of the 
sample (3,000) had no PQI-related visits in 2014; however, 3% of these people reached their deductible 
limit (presumably using other services unmeasured in this study).  80% of the sample (48,000) had at 
least one outpatient visit but had no emergency room or inpatient visits and only 20% of these individuals 
(9,600) reached their deductible limit. Appendix 2 Table 3 presents the marginal cost of care for an 
individual in their final month of enrollment in the sample (the final enrollment month was between 6 and 
12, as inclusion criteria required individuals to have been enrolled for at least six months in 2014).   
 
 
 
  
  74 
 
Out-of-Network Visits and Costs 
 Networks are groups of providers and facilities who have contracted with insurers to provide services 
to beneficiaries of particular plans (Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). To the beneficiary, 
the cost of care differs depending on whether the provider and / or the facility are in- or out-of-network. 
Out-of-network care is generally more expensive for the beneficiary and subject to different plan benefits; 
plans have separate in- and out-of-network deductibles, coinsurances, and annual maximum spending 
limits.  In this study I considered only in-network deductibles, coinsurances, and annual maximum 
spending limits when creating the marginal cost of care variable.  
 Only 15% of this sample was on a narrow network plan and, for beneficiaries of this particular 
insurer, beneficiaries not enrolled on a narrow network plan have fairly low probability of accessing out-of-
network care. Approximately 5% of PQI-related outpatient visits attributable to this sample were out-of-
network and only 2% of PQI-related emergency room visits and 3% of inpatient visits were out-of-network. 
Total spending by this sample on PQI-related out-of-network care in 2014 was only 4%-5% of the total 
costs incurred on in-network care.   
Defining Chronic Conditions  
 The objective of this study was to quantify the effect of the marginal cost of care on receipt of 
different types of healthcare services. In addition to controlling for cost, health status, and time, the 
models for emergency room and inpatient services controlled for receipt of recent outpatient visits; the 
hypothesis was that a lower marginal cost of care would be associated with a higher likelihood that 
individuals would seek outpatient services and that, for individuals with certain chronic conditions, 
outpatient care could potentially reduce the likelihood of an emergency room or inpatient visit.  
 Cost-sharing can have different effects on utilization depending on the reason for accessing services 
(Newhouse, 2006; Basu et al., 2002). Utilization is commonly defined four ways.  Marker conditions are 
events that requires emergency care and are generally not preventable through standard outpatient care, 
such as appendectomies or fractures (Basu et al., 2002; Billings et al., 1993; Holmes, 2014). Preventive 
care services include screening for disease, routine care for chronic conditions, and wellness visits (U.S. 
Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), 2015). Referral sensitive care includes services that are often 
elective, such as joint replacements and coronary angioplasty (Basu et al., 2002). Finally, services for 
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ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSC) are generally considered to be preventable through access 
to outpatient care (Basu et al., 2002).  
 ACSCs are featured in the Prevention Quality Indicators (PQIs), a tool created by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to measure adequacy of services throughout the healthcare 
continuum in a community.  When applied to claims data, the PQIs can be used to identify potentially 
avoidable inpatient procedures (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2001). To quantify the 
effect of the marginal price on care received for ACSCs, the sample was restricted to individuals with: (1) 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) or Asthma, (2) Diabetes, (3) Heart Failure, (4) 
Hypertension, and / or (5) Coronary Heart Disease.  
 Nine PQIs related to these conditions were used to define outcome variables. Related to COPD and 
asthma were PQI 15 - Asthma in Younger Adults Admission Rate (18 -39 years old), and PQI 05 - 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) or Asthma in Older Adults Admission Rate (40 and 
older); related to diabetes were PQI 01 - Diabetes Short-Term Complications Admission Rate, PQI 03 -  
Diabetes Long-term Complications Admission Rate, PQI 14 - Uncontrolled Diabetes Admission Rate, and 
PQI 16 - Rate of Lower-Extremity Amputation Among Patients With Diabetes; related to Hypertension 
was PQI 07 - Hypertension Admission Rate, and related to Congestive Heart Failure (CHF) and Coronary 
Heart Disease were PQI 08 CHF Admission Rate and PQI 13 Angina without Procedure Admission Rate. 
Outcome variables were identified for inclusion using the International Classification of Diseases, 9th 
revision, Clinical Modification codes (ICD-9 codes) listed in the PQI documentation (Agency for Health 
Research and Quality, 2015).  
Outcome Variables 
Outpatient Visits  
 Outpatient visits were identified in the 2014 claims of a large commercial insurer. Outpatient visits 
were identified using ICD-9 codes listed in the PQIs as well as annual wellness visits, initial or period 
comprehensive preventive and physical examinations, or other valuation and management visits. Both 
professional and facility charges were used to identify outpatient visits. Professional claims were identified 
mainly by date and type of visit; any outpatient claims with place of service as “emergency room” were 
excluded.  The facility claims are rolled up into cases (or events) with all the information for one visit 
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linked at the case level; any cases that included a claim with place of service as “emergency room” were 
excluded. Also included were visits specifically for imaging or lab tests. The rationale for including 
imaging and lab tests was that outpatient visits were used to represent maintenance for chronic 
conditions and a lab test (such as an A1C test for diabetes) or imaging (such as an electrocardiogram for 
a heart condition) can be viewed as routine care (e.g. HBA1C testing for diabetes).   
 Outpatient visits (and all outcomes in this study) were coded as binary variables; in any given month 
an individual either had one of the identified outpatient visits, or did not. Because of the way outpatient 
visits were operationalized in the model, not all of these visits are distinctly represented (e.g. if an 
individual had an imaging visits and a CHF-related visit and an E&M visit all in one month, the outcome 
variable was “1” indicating that that individual received routine outpatient care in that month).  
Defining Emergency Room and Inpatient Visits  
 Similar to outpatient visits, emergency room visits are identified at the case level; in a case all claims 
relevant to an event are linked. If any claim associated with a case (care event) was identified as having 
occurred in the emergency room than that case was coded as an emergency room visit. Identifying visits 
at the case level has the added advantage of removing duplicate “visits” which are really only one visit 
with claims spanning multiple days. Emergency room visits exclude cases in which an individual was 
admitted through the emergency room; these are coded as inpatient visits. Inpatient visits are also 
defined at the case level and identified using facility charges. 
 Both emergency room and inpatient visits were identified using ICD-9 codes provider by AHRQ for 
identifying PQIs in claims data. The diagnosis and procedure codes included in the PQIs are specifically 
designed to identify events in an inpatient setting. The same set of ICD-9 diagnosis codes were used for 
outpatient, emergency room, and inpatient visits, however the procedure codes were only used to identify 
inpatient care. Procedure codes were relevant for hypertension, amputation due to diabetes, and all the 
heart conditions (Agency for Health Research and Quality, 2015).  
Accounting for Duplicate or Overlapping Visits 
 Outpatient visits were intended to represent routine care and maintenance for chronic conditions. 
One objective of this study was to model the effect of the marginal cost of care and recent outpatient care 
on potentially avoidable inpatient visits. In practice, individuals may visit their primary care provider or 
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specialist for a concern they have regarding a chronic condition but, if the condition has not been properly 
cared for or has already worsened, the provider may suggest the individual be admitted for an emergency 
procedure or inpatient stay. For example, if a diabetic patient visits their provider in an outpatient setting 
for swollen feet and the doctor admits them that day or the next day there may be an outpatient visit and 
inpatient admission but they would both be related to the same event. Most likely, the individual intended 
to have an outpatient visit by seeing their provider in an office setting, however, their condition had 
already worsened to the point where they will now have an inpatient visit which potentially could have 
been avoided had their seen their provider earlier when the problem would still have been manageable in 
an outpatient setting. To systematically categorize overlapping (or nearly overlapping) outpatient and 
inpatient visits I adopted Medicare’s 3-day payment window for reimbursement. 
 Medicare’s 3-day payment window for reimbursement was established under a provision in law 
passed in 2010 regarding Medicare beneficiaries and pension relief (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid, 
2014). The provision required that claims for inpatient visits must include “the diagnoses, procedures, and 
charges for all outpatient diagnostic services and admission-related outpatient nondiagnostic services 
that are furnished to the beneficiary during the 3-day (or 1-day) payment window,” meaning that all 
outpatient charges were included in reimbursement for the inpatient visit. In our model, the rule was 
applied so that any outpatient visits that occurred within the three days prior to an inpatient admission 
were not classified as outpatient visits, but the inpatient admission did count towards that measured 
outcome.  
Chronological proximity of Outpatient Visits  
 AHRQ defines ACSCs as “conditions for which good outpatient care can potentially prevent the need 
for hospitalization, or for which early intervention can prevent complications or more severe disease,” 
(Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2001).  The documentation on the PQIs makes it clear that 
the tool is best used in terms of population health and, as such, the documentation does not make 
recommendations for specific individuals. Although the PQIs represent potentially avoidable conditions, 
not all events noted in the PQIs could have been avoided. Because each individual is unique and the 
severity of their condition is a function of genetics, ability to maintain the condition, comorbidities, socio-
economic conditions, and a host of other factors, “good outpatient care” may differ from one individual to 
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the next. In this study, I am assuming that many of the individuals in my sample should expect to see an 
outpatient provider for their conditions at least once during the year – at the least, maintenance of these 
conditions may require medications with prescriptions requiring annual fills.  Considering the timeframe 
for this study was one year, I defined a “recent” outpatient visit as one that occurred within the past three 
months.  I created a variable with memory to indicate if an individual had at least one outpatient visit in 
the past three months or not.   
 I conducted a sensitivity analysis around the three month definition of recent outpatient care by 
broadening the definition to six months prior to an inpatient visit. Many of the results are robust to this 
definition change but not all (Appendix 2 Table 4, subgroup results not shown). When recent outpatient 
care was defined as three months a marginal cost of care of zero has no statistically significant effect on 
the likelihood of having an emergency room but, when the definition of recent was increased to six 
months, a marginal cost of care of zero does cross the threshold for statistical significance. In terms of 
clinical significance there was not much difference in the risk ratio for the marginal cost of care being zero 
between the three month and six months definitions (RR=1.08, CI:0.99-1.18 vs. RR=1.09, CI: 1.00-1.19). 
 Regardless of whether it was defined as three or six months, the effect of a recent outpatient visit on 
emergency room visits was positive; however, the impact of a recent outpatient visit has a greater impact 
on the probability of having an emergency room visit when the outpatient visit occurred in the past three 
months (RR= 1.38, CI = 1.29-1.48 vs. RR=1.24, CI: 1.15-1.34). All results for the two subgroups were 
robust to a change in the definition for recent outpatient visits with one exception in the subgroup of 
individuals with copayments for emergency room services; the impact of having had a recent outpatient 
visit was positive but the effect on the likelihood of an emergency room visit was larger when the 
outpatient visit occurred in the three months prior (RR=1.33, CI: 1.24-1.42 vs. RR=1.20, CI: 1.11-1.29).   
 When the outcome variable was inpatient admissions, all results for the entire sample and the two 
subgroups were robust to a change in the definition for recent outpatient visits with two exceptions. The 
impact of a recent outpatient visit has a statistically significant impact on the probability of having an 
inpatient admission when the outpatient visit occurred in the past three months, however when recent 
was defined as six months, the effect of an outpatient visit on the probability of an inpatient admission 
was no longer statistically significant (RR= 1.30, CI = 1.14-1.48 vs. RR=1.11, CI: 0.96-1.27). For the 
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subgroup of individuals with copayments for outpatient services, the impact of having had a recent 
outpatient visit was positive, but the effect on the likelihood of an inpatient admission was larger when the 
outpatient visit occurred in the three months prior (RR=1.37, CI: 1.19-1.58 vs. RR=1.18, CI: 1.01-1.37).   
Types of Plans 
 The type of plan in which an individual was enrolled could impact the effect of the marginal cost of 
care on utilization. Individuals whose plans offer copayments for outpatient or emergency services, in 
general, pay an upfront amount for that visit, however not all outpatient visits, and not all services 
provided during those visits, are eligible for copayments (Department of Health and Human Services, 
2014). Individuals with copayments may still receive a bill for outpatient visits or portions of outpatient 
visits. Alternatively, for individuals in the “no copayments” subgroups, individuals pay the entirety of all 
portions of all outpatient visits until the deductible is met.   
 The sample for this study was stratified into two subgroups: individuals with copayments for certain 
services and individuals for whom the outcome was always subject to the deductible. Ninety percent of 
individuals in the “no copayments” subgroup were on high deductible health plans (HDHPs). The US 
Government defines high deductible as any plan with a deductible of $1,250 or higher, this distinction is 
used to qualify individuals for health savings accounts (HSAs) (Internal Revenue Service, 2015).  HSAs 
are accounts where qualified individuals can save pre-tax dollars to use tax-free on healthcare expenses, 
the money is invested by the individual and belongs to the individual (i.e. the money rolls over from year-
to-year) (Department of Health and Human Services, 2014).  729 people who had no copayments for any 
services (1.2% percent of the full sample) were ineligible for an HSA.  238 of these individuals had no 
copayments but were not on a HDHP. These individuals were on a qualified health plan (QHP; ACA-
compliant plan) with $0 deductibles; no other individuals in the sample had $0 deductible. 446 individuals 
had in-network, individual deductibles of either $10,000 or $20,000; these plans are not ACA-compliant; 
the out-of-pocket maximum for in-network care in 2014 was $6,350 for an individual.   
 I conducted a sensitivity analysis for including the 729 individuals without copayments or HSAs with 
the individuals on HDHPs in the no copayments subgroup.  The results were robust to the inclusion of 
individuals without HSAs, no risk ratios were statistically significantly different (Appendix 2 Table 5). Since 
these individuals met the inclusion criteria, they were included in the sample.   
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Enrolled Months 
 The marginal price variable was a function of care used to-date. Individuals who were less 
healthy and individuals enrolled on a plan for a longer amount of time were likely to have utilized more 
care by a given month in the year than individuals who were healthier or had been enrolled on a plan for 
less time. To obtain a more pure effect of the marginal price on utilization, I controlled for health risk in 
every month (see Section: Risk Score Distribution and Table 1) and well as length of time on a plan. I 
operationalized length of enrollment as a binary indicator for whether or not an individual was enrolled on 
a plan for more than six months in any given month.  
 I conducted a sensitivity analysis using indicators for the number of months enrolled to date in the 
given month (up to twelve indicators for individuals enrolled the full twelve months). The results were 
robust to representing length of enrollment as monthly indicators. There were no statistically significant 
changes in the risk ratios (Appendix 2 Table 6) 
Variance Inflation Factor  
 Because the marginal cost of care variable partially reflects health status and amount of time on a 
plan, I checked the variance inflation factor (VIF) score to determine if the model was violating the 
principle of multicollinariaty, correlation among the explanatory variables are correlated (Wooldridge, 
2009). There is no defined cut-off for VIF scores (some researchers claims 10 is valid others use a cut-off 
of 2).  In this model, all VIF scores were below 2 suggesting multicollinariaty is not a problem (Appendix 2 
Table 7). 
Marginal Cost of Care Indicators  
 The marginal cost of care variable could take on a value of 0, 1, or a percent equal to the 
coinsurance (if applicable). The variable was calculated on a monthly basis and changes in the variable 
are reflected in the subsequent month. A one month lag was introduced to the marginal cost of care 
variable. For example, if an individual reached their deductible during the month of May, the marginal 
price variable recognized this milestone in June. The lag was included to better represent real world 
behavior; because of claims delays, individuals may not immediately respond to changes in the marginal 
price.  
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 The values of the marginal cost of care variable are mutually exclusive in any given month. The 
marginal price variable was operationalized as three mutually exclusive binary variables for whether or 
not an individual’s marginal cost of care was (1) 0, (2) 1, or (3) “other,” with the “other” variable including 
any values of the marginal price between 0 and 1.  Not every subgroup has beneficiaries with all five 
coinsurance levels in the sample. Appendix 2 Table 8 displays the number of individuals in each 
subgroup by level of coinsurance.   
 I conducted a sensitivity analysis where, instead of operationalizing the marginal cost of care as 
three binary indicators, I operationalized care as six binary indicators for each of the possible levels of the 
marginal cost of care variable (Appendix Table 9). While some of the risk ratios on the individual marginal 
cost of care variables are significant, the other risk ratios of the other variables in the model are all robust 
to changes in the formation of the marginal cost of care variable. Because some of the marginal cost of 
care variables have small numbers of beneficiaries (especially in the subsections, see Table 8) I opted to 
include only three indicator variables for the marginal cost of care rather than six variables, one for each 
level of coinsurance.  
 Because I am using a Fixed Effects model, each individual is their own control. In any given month 
for a single individual, the marginal cost of care variable associated with an individual can only take on 
one of three possible levels (0,1, or a pre-defined percentage).  The marginal price care variable is 
capturing the risk ratio for having a marginal cost of care equal to the coinsurance rather than the 
marginal cost of care being 100% for a particular individual. Because each person serves as their own 
control, there is less benefit in comparing the effect of a decrease in the marginal cost of care from 100% 
to 40% for individual 1 and the effect of a decrease in the marginal cost of care from 100% to 20% for 
individual 2. 
Alternative Pathways  
 This model estimates the effects on receipt of emergency room and inpatient care of both receipt of 
recent outpatient care and the marginal cost of care. I conducted two separate sensitivity analyses 
capture the direct effect of receipt of outpatient care and marginal price. In sensitivity analysis 1, I looked 
at the direct pathway of the marginal cost of care on receipt of emergency room visits and inpatient visits 
(not controlling for recent outpatient visits). In sensitivity analysis 2, I checked the direct pathway of 
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outpatient care on receipt of emergency room visits and inpatient visits (not controlling for the marginal 
cost of care). 
 
 The results are robust to receipt of recent outpatient care; controlling for outpatient visits does not 
significantly change the effect of the marginal cost of care on the likelihood of an emergency room or 
inpatient visit (Appendix Table 10). Only results for the entire sample are shown; results were similarly 
robust for subgroups (subgroup result tables available upon request). 
 The results are also robust to the inclusion of the marginal cost of care variable. There is no 
statistically significant change in effect of outpatient visits on likelihood of emergency room or inpatient 
when I do not control for the marginal cost of care in the model (Appendix 2 Table 11). Only results for the 
entire sample are shown; results were similarly robust for subgroups (subgroup result tables available 
upon request). 
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Individuals New to Insurance 
 An additional subgroup analysis was conducted in which I stratified by whether or not a beneficiary 
had a 2013 health plan with the same insurer as in 2014. Individuals were considered “renewing” if they 
had been insured with this insurer in previous year, even if they switched plans. Individuals were 
classified as “new” if they had not previously had an insurance plan with this particular insurer. The 
dataset did not allow for identification of whether individuals classified as “new” ever had insurance prior 
to 2014 or just switched from another insurer.  
 Individuals who were new to this particular insurer in 2014 had a higher baseline risk of an outpatient 
visit (41% versus 29%); however, reaching the annual spending limit had a smaller effect the likelihood of 
an outpatient visit (RR: 1.02, CI: 1.00-1.03 versus RR: 1.20, CI: 1.15-1.24) (Appendix 2 Table 12). 
Individuals who were new had a higher baseline risk of an emergency room visit before reaching their 
deductible (1.5% versus 0.5%) and a higher baseline risk of an inpatient admission compared to renewing 
individuals (0.4% versus 0.1%). Reaching annual spending limits reduced the risk of an inpatient 
admission for new individuals but had no significant effect on the risk of an inpatient admission for 
renewing individuals (RR=0.69 CI: 0.60-0.79 versus RR=1.02, CI: 0.71-1.47). 
 The effect of the marginal cost of care on outpatient visits and inpatient admissions is statistically 
significantly different for people who were new to this insurer in 2014 versus those who were renewing. 
People who were new did have a greater probability of an outpatient visit after reaching their annual limit 
but the risk ratio is significantly smaller than the effect of the change in the marginal care for renewing 
beneficiaries (RR = 1.02, CI: 1.00-1.03 versus RR = 1.20, CI: 1.15-1.24). For renewing individuals, having 
reaching annual spending limits does not significantly change the likelihood of inpatient admissions; for 
these individuals inpatient admissions are more significantly influenced by health risk (RR = 6.48, CI: 
5.04-8.33). Although health risk has a large influence on receipt of inpatient admissions for both 
subgroups, the effect is significantly smaller for new individuals (RR =3.24, CI: 2.89-3.63, Appendix 2 
Table 13). New individuals are less likely to have an inpatient admission when the marginal cost of care is 
0 than when it is 1 (RR = 0.69, CI: 0.60-0.79). Having had an outpatient visit in the past three months has 
no significant effect on emergency room or inpatient admissions for new individuals, while having a recent 
outpatient visit increases the likelihood of both emergency room and inpatient admissions for renewing 
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individuals (RR =2.16, CI: 1.84-2.52 and RR = 1.68, CI: 1.29-2.19). These differences suggest that 
individuals who are new to this insurer (or to insurance in general) may use coverage differently than 
individuals who are familiar with their insurer. For renewing individuals with chronic conditions who are 
perhaps more familiar with how health insurance works or have an established relationship with their 
provider, these results suggest complementary care between outpatient and inpatient services. 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
Table 13: QIC Comparison with Different Interpretations of Risk Score for all Three Outcomes 
Outcome Outpatient Emergency Room Inpatient  
Categorical Risk  1,487,216.2317 78,696.6710 27,151.8614 
Continuous / Quadratic Risk  0.0088 11,936.8348 5,486.2661 
QICu    
Outcome Outpatient Emergency Room Inpatient  
Categorical Risk  1,487,211.2413 78,693.8104 27,150.5295 
Continuous / Quadratic Risk  12.0088 11,946.1329 5,494.8650 
 
  
  
 
 
Table 14: Sensitivity Analysis for Operationalizing the Risk Score Variable 
Risk as Categorical  Risk as Continuous and Quadratic 
Outpatient Model (full sample)  RR  95% CI  
 
Outpatient Model (full sample) 95% CI  95% 
MCC = 1 1.00   REF  REF  
 
MCC = 1 1.00   REF  REF  
MCC = Other 1.16  1.15  1.18  
 
MCC = Other 1.10  1.09  1.12  
MCC = 0  1.07  1.06  1.09  
 
MCC = 0  1.06  1.05  1.08  
Top 75
th
 of risk score 1.51  1.49  1.52  
 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.76  1.71  1.80  
Bottom 25th of risk score 0.43  0.42  0.43  
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95  0.94  0.95  
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.93  0.93  0.94  
 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.97  0.96  0.97  
         
Emergency Room Model (full sample) RR 95% CI  
 
Emergency Room Model (full sample) RR 95% CI  
MCC = 1 1.00   REF   REF  
 
MCC = 1 1.00   REF   REF  
MCC = Other 0.79  0.70   0.88  
 
MCC = Other 0.74  0.66  0.83  
MCC = 0  1.24  1.15  1.35  
 
MCC = 0  1.08  0.99  1.18  
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months  
1.16  1.08  1.24  
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months  1.38  1.29  1.47  
Top 75
th
 of risk score 2.36  2.23  2.50  
 
Risk Score (continuous) 2.00  1.82  2.20  
Bottom 25th of risk score 0.42  0.39  0.46  
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95  0.94  0.97  
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.78  0.74  0.82  
 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.81  0.77  0.85  
         
Inpatient Model (full sample)  RR  95% CI  
 
Inpatient Model (full sample)  RR  95% CI  
MCC = 1 1.00   REF  REF  
 
MCC = 1 1.00   REF  REF  
MCC = Other 0.86  0.74  1.01  
 
MCC = Other 0.64  0.53  0.76  
MCC = 0  1.35  1.21  1.51  
 
MCC = 0  0.80  0.70  0.91  
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months  
0.93  0.82  1.06  
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months  1.30  1.14  1.48  
Top 75
th
 of risk score 11.98  10.57  13.58  
 
Risk Score (continuous) 3.43  3.06  3.83  
Bottom 25th of risk score 0.06  0.03  0.12  
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93  0.92  0.94  
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.79  0.72  0.86  
 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.97  0.89  1.06  
MCC = Marginal Cost of Care 
RR = Risk Ratio 
CI = Confidence Interval 
8
6
 
  
 
 
 Table 15: Marginal Cost of Care by Maximum Enrolled Month 
 
 
  
 
MCC = 1 (Never Reached 
Deductible) 
MCC = Other (Paying 
Coinsurance) 
MCC = 0 (Reached OOP Max) 
Total (Maximum Number of 
Months Enrolled) 
 N 
Percent of Total 
Sample 
N 
Percent of Total 
Sample 
N 
Percent of Total 
Sample 
N 
Percent of Total 
Sample 
Month 6 1,290 2% 94 0% 166 0% 1,550 3% 
Month 7 1,493 3% 118 0% 281 0% 1,892 3% 
Month 8 5,914 10% 424 1% 1,432 2% 7,770 13% 
Month 9 5,112 9% 401 1% 1,435 2% 6,948 12% 
Month 10 3,554 6% 294 0% 1,044 2% 4,892 8% 
Month 11 3,501 6% 340 1% 1,103 2% 4,944 8% 
Month 12 24,692 41% 2,991 5% 3,905 7% 31,588 53% 
Total 45,556 76% 4,662 8% 9,366 16% 59,584 100% 
MCC = Marginal Cost of Care                                                            
OOP Max = Out-of-Pocket Maximum  
8
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Table 16: Sensitivity Analysis for Definition of “Recent” Outpatient Visit 
 
  
Full Sample – 3Month Definition  Full Sample – 6 Month Definition 
Emergency Room Visits with Outpatient 
Visits 
RR 95% CI 
 
Emergency Room Visits with Outpatient 
Visits 
RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 0.74 0.66 0.83 
 
MCC = Other 0.75 0.66 0.84 
MCC = 0  1.08 0.99 1.18 
 
MCC = 0  1.09 1.00 1.19 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months  1.38 1.29 1.48 
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 6 months 1.24 1.15 1.34 
Risk Score (continuous) 2.00 1.81 2.20 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 2.04 1.86 2.25 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95 0.94 0.97 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95 0.94 0.96 
Enrolled more than 6 months 0.81 0.77 0.85 
 
Enrolled more than 6 months 0.81 0.77 0.85 
         
Inpatient Admissions with Outpatient 
Visits 
RR 95% CI 
 
Inpatient Admissions with Outpatient 
Visits 
RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 0.64 0.53 0.76 
 
MCC = Other 0.64 0.54 0.76 
MCC = 0  0.80 0.70 0.91 
 
MCC = 0 0.81 0.71 0.92 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months 1.30 1.14 1.48 
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 6 months 1.11 0.96 1.27 
Risk Score (continuous) 3.43 3.06 3.83 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 3.47 3.10 3.88 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93 0.92 0.94 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93 0.92 0.94 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.97 0.89 1.06 
 
Enrolled more than 6 months 0.98 0.90 1.07 
MCC = Marginal Cost of Care 
RR = Risk Ratio 
CI = Confidence Interval 
8
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Table 17: Sensitivity Analysis for Inclusion of Individuals with No Copayments and No HSA 
All individuals without copayments for outpatient services  High Deducible Health Plan Only 
Outpatient Model  RR 95% CI 
 
Outpatient Model  RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 1.27 1.20 1.32 
 
MCC = Other 1.31 1.17 1.48 
MCC = 0  1.29 1.21 1.37 
 
MCC = 0  1.23 1.17 1.29 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.68 1.50 1.88 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.66 1.48 1.86 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.96 0.94 0.98 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.96 0.94 0.98 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.10 0.98 1.02 
 
Enrolled more than 6 months  1.01 0.99 1.04 
         
Emergency Room with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
 
Emergency Room with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 1.25 0.82 1.89 
 
MCC = Other 0.79 0.33 1.92 
MCC = 0  1.00 0.75 1.35 
 
MCC = 0  0.87 0.64 1.16 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months  1.61 1.28 2.02 
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months 1.36 1.06 1.74 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.55 1.31 1.84 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.57 1.35 1.83 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.98 0.97 1.00 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.98 0.97 0.10 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.86 0.72 1.01 
 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.93 0.77 1.11 
         
Inpatient Model with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
 
Inpatient Model with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 0.61 0.31 1.21 
 
MCC = Other 1.27 0.49 3.30 
MCC = 0  0.64 0.45 0.91 
 
MCC = 0  0.65 0.45 0.93 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months 0.91 0.62 1.33 
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months 0.75 0.49 1.14 
Risk Score (continuous) 4.86 2.85 8.27 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 4.73 2.76 8.12 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.89 0.83 0.96 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.90 0.83 0.96 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.91 0.70 1.19 
 
Enrolled more than 6 months 0.94 0.70 1.25 
MCC = Marginal Cost of Care 
RR = Risk Ratio 
CI = Confidence Interval 
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Table 18: Sensitivity Analysis of Operationalization of Time Enrolled 
 
Full Sample– 6 month Binary Indicator for Time  Full Sample – 12 Indicators for Months 
Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
 
Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 1.06 1.05 1.08 
 
MCC = Other 1.06 1.05 1.08 
MCC = 0 1.10 1.09 1.12 
 
MCC = 0 1.11 1.09 1.12 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.76 1.71 1.80 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.75 1.71 1.80 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95 0.95 0.95 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95 0.95 0.95 
         
Emergency Room with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
 
Emergency Room with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 0.74 0.66 0.83 
 
MCC = Other 0.76 0.68 0.86 
MCC = 0 1.08 0.99 1.18 
 
MCC = 0 1.10 1.01 1.21 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months 1.38 1.29 1.48 
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months 1.42 1.32 1.53 
Risk Score (continuous) 2.00 1.82 2.20 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.99 1.81 2.19 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95 0.94 0.97 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95 0.94 0.97 
         
Inpatient Admissions with Outpatient 
Visits 
RR 95% CI 
 
Inpatient Admissions with Outpatient 
Visits 
RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 0.64 0.53 0.76 
 
MCC = Other 0.64 0.54 0.77 
MCC = 0 0.80 0.70 0.91 
 
MCC = 0 0.80 0.70 0.92 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months 1.30 1.14 1.48 
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months 1.37 1.19 1.57 
Risk Score (continuous) 3.43 3.06 3.83 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 3.41 3.05 3.82 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93 0.92 0.94 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93 0.92 0.94 
MCC = Marginal Cost of Care 
RR = Risk Ratio 
CI = Confidence Interval 
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Table 19: Variance Inflation Factor Scores 
  
 
Table 20:  Coinsurance Size by Subgroup 
 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| Variance Inflation Factor 
Intercept 0.3807 0.00276 138.04 <.0001 0 
Marginal Cost of Care -0.10159 0.00217 -46.89 <.0001 1.21366 
Retrospective Risk 0.10551 0.000638 165.38 <.0001 1.15556 
Indicator of 6 Months Enrolled -0.00154 0.000187 -8.26 <.0001 1.05444 
Coinsurance HDHP 
N = 6,271 
OP and ER Copay 
N = 49,239 
OP Copay Only (no ER Copay) 
N = 3,344 
No Copays 
N = 729 
Total 
N = 59,583 
0 5,569 594 239 408 6,810 
20% 99 10,163 697 38 10,997 
30%  37,721 1,403 72 39,196 
40%   1,005  1,005 
50% 603 761  211 1,575 
      
OP  = Outpatient 
ER = Emergency Room  
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Table 21: Sensitivity Analysis for Operationalizing Marginal Cost of Care Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
Full Sample - 3 MCC Indicator Variables  Full Sample - 6 MCC Indicator Variables 
Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
 
Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00  REF   REF  
 
MCC = 1 1.00  REF   REF  
MCC = Other 1.06  1.05  1.08  
 
MCC = 20 1.08  1.05 1.10 
     
MCC = 30 1.06  1.04  1.08  
     
MCC = 40 0.88  0.77  1.00  
     
MCC = 50 1.06  1.00  1.14  
MCC = 0  1.10  1.09  1.12  
 
MCC = 0 1.11  1.09  1.12  
Risk Score (continuous) 1.76  1.71  1.80  
 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.75  1.71  1.80  
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95  0.95  0.95  
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95  0.95  0.95  
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.97  0.96  0.97  
 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.97  0.96  0.98  
ER Visits with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
 
ER Visits with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00   REF   REF  
 
MCC = 1 1.00   REF   REF  
MCC = Other 0.74  0.66  0.83  
 
MCC = 20 0.67  0.56  0.81  
     
MCC = 30 0.81  0.70  0.94  
     
MCC = 40 0.31  0.12  0.81  
     
MCC = 50 0.75  0.48  1.17  
MCC = 0  1.08  0.99 1.18  
 
MCC = 0 1.08  0.99  1.18  
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months  
1.38  1.29  1.48  
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months  
1.38  1.29  1.48  
Risk Score (continuous) 2.00  1.82  2.20  
 
Risk Score (continuous) 2.00  1.82  2.20  
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95  0.94  0.97  
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95  0.94  0.96  
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.81  0.77  0.85  
 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.81 0.78  0.86  
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Table 21: Sensitivity Analysis for operationalizing Marginal Cost of Care Indicators (continued…) 
Inpatient Admissions with Outpatient 
Visits 
RR 95% CI 
 
Inpatient Admissions with Outpatient 
Visits 
95% CI RR 
MCC = 1 1.00   REF   REF  
 
MCC = 1 1.00   REF  
 
REF  
MCC = Other 0.64  0.53  0.76  
 
MCC = 20 0.64  0.51  0.81 
     
MCC = 30 0.61  0.48  0.78  
     
MCC = 40 0.57  0.16  2.01  
     
MCC = 50 0.92  0.50  1.69  
MCC = 0  0.80  0.70  0.91  
 
MCC = 0 0.80  0.71  0.91  
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months  
1.30  1.14  1.48  
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months  
1.31 1.15 1.49  
Risk Score (continuous) 3.43  3.06  3.83  
 
Risk Score (continuous) 3.42  3.06  3.82  
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93  0.92  0.94  
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93  0.92  0.94  
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.97  0.89  1.06  
 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.98  0.90  1.07  
MCC = Marginal Cost of Care                               
RR = Risk Ratio               
CI = Confidence Interval 
ER = Emergency Room  
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Table 22: Sensitivity Analysis 1 (Direct Effect of Marginal Cost on ER and IP) 
 
  
Full Sample - With Outpatient Visits  Full Sample - No Controlling for Outpatient Visits 
Emergency Room Visits RR 95% CI 
 
Emergency Room Visits RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 0.74 0.66 0.83 
 
MCC = Other 0.76 0.67 0.85 
MCC = 0  1.08 0.99 1.18 
 
MCC = 0 1.10 1.01 1.20 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months  1.38 1.29 1.48 
     
Risk Score (continuous) 2.00 1.82 2.20 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 2.11 1.91 2.32 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95 0.94 0.97 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95 0.93 0.96 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.81 0.77 0.85 
 
Enrolled more than 6 months 0.83 0.79 0.87 
         
Inpatient Admissions  RR 95% CI 
 
Inpatient Admissions RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 0.64 0.53 0.76 
 
MCC = Other 0.64 0.54 0.77 
MCC = 0  0.80 0.70 0.91 
 
MCC = 0 0.81 0.71 0.92 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 months  1.30 1.14 1.48 
     
Risk Score (continuous) 3.43 3.06 3.83 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 3.51 3.14 3.92 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93 0.92 0.94 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93 0.92 0.94 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.97 0.89 1.06 
 
Enrolled more than 6 months 0.99 0.90 1.08 
MCC = Marginal Cost of Care 
RR = Risk Ratio 
CI = Confidence Interval 
9
4
 
  
 
 
Table 23: Sensitivity Analysis 2 (Direct Effect of Recent Outpatient Visit on ER and IP) 
 
 
 
Full Sample - with Marginal Cost of Care  Full Sample – no Marginal Cost of Care 
Emergency Room Visits  RR 95% CI  Emergency Room Visits  RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1         
MCC = Other 0.74 0.66 0.83   
   
MCC = 0  1.08 0.99 1.18   
   
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months  
1.38 1.29 1.48 
 Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months  
1.38 1.29 1.48 
Risk Score (continuous) 2.00 1.82 2.20  Risk Score (continuous) 1.99 1.82 2.18 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95 0.94 0.97  Risk Score (quadratic) 0.95 0.94 0.97 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.81 0.77 0.85  Enrolled more than 6 months  0.81 0.77 0.85 
         
Inpatient Admissions  RR 95% CI  Inpatient Admissions RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1         
MCC = Other 0.64 0.53 0.76   
   
MCC = 0  0.80 0.70 0.91   
   
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months  
1.30 1.14 1.48 
 Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months  
1.28 1.12 1.46 
Risk Score (continuous) 3.43 3.06 3.83  Risk Score (continuous) 3.26 2.93 3.61 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93 0.92 0.94  Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93 0.92 0.94 
Enrolled more than 6 months  0.97 0.89 1.06  Enrolled more than 6 months  0.91 0.84 0.99 
MCC = Marginal Cost of Care 
RR = Risk Ratio 
CI = Confidence Interval 
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Table 24: Probabilities of Outcomes 
 
  
New Subgroup MCC = 1 MCC = Other MCC = 0 
 
Renewing subgroup MCC = 1 MCC = Other MCC = 0 
OP Visits (percent) 41.0% 53.8% 59.8% 
 
OP Visits (percent) 29.0% 48.5% 52.2% 
ER Visits (percent) 1.5% 1.5% 2.4% 
 
ER Visits (percent) 0.5% 1.0% 0.9% 
IP Visits (percent) 0.4% 0.6% 1.2% 
 
IP Visits (percent) 0.1% 0.6% 0.7% 
Health Risk (mean) 0.90 1.48 2.15 
 
Health Risk (mean) 0.81 1.87 1.76 
Health Risk (median) 0.68 1.11 1.54 
 
Health Risk (median) 0.64 1.37 1.30 
Enrolled more than 6 
months (mean) 
35.3% 56.4% 68.7% 
 
Enrolled more than 6 
months (mean) 
45.9% 73.8% 78.3% 
OP = Outpatient 
ER = Emergency Room  
IP = Inpatient  
MCC = Marginal Cost of Care 
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Table 25: Risk Ratios for Subgroup Analysis: New and Renewing 
New Individuals  Renewing Individuals 
Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
 
Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 1.08 1.06 1.10 
 
MCC = Other 1.09 1.06 1.12 
MCC = 0 1.02 1.00 1.03 
 
MCC = 0 1.20 1.15 1.24 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.66 1.62 1.70 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 2.16 2.06 2.26 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.96 0.95 0.96 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.91 0.90 0.92 
Enrolled more than 6 months 0.98 0.98 0.99 
 
Enrolled more than 6 months 1.02 1.01 1.03 
ER with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
 
ER with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.000 REF REF 
MCC = Other 0.78 0.68 0.89 
 
MCC = Other 0.85 0.68 1.05 
MCC = 0 0.93 0.85 1.02 
 
MCC = 0 0.85 0.63 1.14 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months 
1.04 0.96 1.13 
 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months 
2.16 1.84 2.52 
Risk Score (continuous) 1.94 1.75 2.15 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 2.45 2.02 2.98 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.96 0.94 0.97 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.93 0.90 0.96 
Enrolled more than 6 months 0.86 0.82 0.91 
 
Enrolled more than 6 months 1.01 0.91 1.14 
Inpatient Admissions with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
 
Inpatient Admissions with Outpatient Visits RR 95% CI 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
 
MCC = 1 1.00 REF REF 
MCC = Other 0.72 0.58 0.89 
 
MCC = Other 0.80 0.60 1.07 
MCC = 0 0.69 0.60 0.79 
 
MCC = 0 1.02 0.71 1.47 
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months 
1.02 0.88 1.18  
Had an outpatient visit in the past 3 
months 
1.68 1.29 2.19 
Risk Score (continuous) 3.24 2.89 3.63 
 
Risk Score (continuous) 6.48 5.04 8.33 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.94 0.92 0.95 
 
Risk Score (quadratic) 0.85 0.81 0.88 
Enrolled more than 6 months 1.09 0.99 1.21 
 
Enrolled more than 6 months 0.86 0.70 1.05 
MCC = Marginal Cost of Care 
RR = Risk Ratio 
ER = Emergency Room 
CI = Confidence Interval 
9
7
 
  
98 
 
APPENDIX 2: RANDOM EFFECTS AND TREND ANALYSIS FROM AIM 3 
 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
 In a panel dataset with two or more time periods (each observation has two rows of data, one for 
each year), the error terms are therefore correlated (i.e., the error term for person A in time 1 is not 
independent from the error term for person A in time 2. However, the error term for person A in time 1 is 
independent from the error term for person B in time 1).  In aim 3, I considered both Fixed Effect (FE) and 
Random Effect (RE) models for this dataset. When considering the options for modeling panel data it can 
be helpful to decompose the error term into two components: the time invariant error ( 𝜇𝑖) and the time 
variant error (𝜈𝑖𝑡).  
 Models with individual level fixed effects effectively have a unique intercept for each individual.  
These models use only “within” variation and do not generate estimates for time invariant variables.  FE 
models are not efficient (they have a large variance) because they lose many degrees of freedom from 
the estimation of an intercept for each observation. RE models are more efficient but could potentially be 
biased. For RE to not be biased, the time invariant error term must be uncorrelated with the independent 
variables.  We also assume the mean of the error terms (both time variant and invariant) are zero and the 
errors are homoskedastic.  
 Both RE and FE are consistent (as N approaches infinity, the estimate approaches to the true 
parameter), so the choice depends on whether RE is biased. When the coefficients on variables from RE 
and FE models are the same, as they are here, that tells us RE is unbiased. Because RE is more efficient 
and allows us to generate estimates for time invariant controls, I decided to use RE for all models. Even 
though it appears as if RE for the outpatient visits outcome is biased I believe these results are 
misleading. The outpatient visits outcome is a count variable and the fixed effects model in SAS is not as 
flexible as random effects and does not allow specification of a distribution (such as Poisson), this is also 
why the estimates are different than the ones that appear in the results table in the paper.  
Coefficient on the Interaction Term Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
Outpatient Visits (0.425)  (0.242) 
         Outpatient Visits (exp(coefficient)) 0.654   0.785  
Percentage with Participating Providers 9.01% 9.37% 
Total Costs -33.01% -32.07% 
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Trend Analysis 
 Difference-in-difference models control for pre-period differences between groups but, to ensure that 
the group not receiving the treatment provides a satisfactory comparison group, it is important to make 
sure that, absent the treatment, these two groups would be behave similarly. One way to accomplish this 
is to examine the pre-intervention trends in the outcome variables. If the pre-intervention trends are not 
parallel than we will not be able to confidently differentiate between the effect of the intervention and the 
natural progression of differences between the two groups (Ryan et al., 2015).  
 In aim 3, I looked at average visits, percentage of visits with participating providers, and expenditures 
on outpatient visits in years 2011, 2012, and 2013 and found parallel trends between the two groups. 
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Appendix 2: Figures 
Figure 3: Aim 3 Outpatient Visits (Professional and Facility Claims with Physicians or Mid-Level Providers 
- excluding inpatient and emergency room visits) 
 
Year Not-Narrow Network Narrow Network Ratio - Narrow : Not-Narrow 
2011 10.69 8.45 0.790  
2012 11.98 9.63 0.804  
2013 14.08 10.65 0.756  
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Figure 4: Aim 3 Percent of Outpatient Visits with Physicians or Mid-Level Providers Participating in the 
Narrow Network 
 
Year Not-Narrow Network Narrow Network Ratio - Narrow : Not-Narrow 
2011 0.47 0.51 0.92 
2012 0.48 0.54 0.89 
2013 0.49 0.57 0.86 
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Figure 5: Aim 3 Healthcare Expenditures (Member Liability on Outpatient Visits) 
 
 
Year Not-Narrow Network Narrow Network Ratio - Narrow : Not-Narrow 
2011  $         103.01   $          97.77          0.949  
2012  $         112.08   $       108.31          0.966  
2013  $         115.29   $       111.61          0.968  
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